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Abstract
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when
ﬁrms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development. If demand growth
and volatility are high, attrition occurs and IPRs should ensure the cost of imitation attains
a lower bound we identify. If demand growth and volatility are low then provided that entry
is business-stealing, IPRs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption,
and possibly winner-take-all preemption. Moreover, the welfare achieved with optimal IPRs
is then greater with endogenous innovation than if ﬁrm roles are predetermined, illustrating
the importance of fostering dynamic competition. In extensions we show how ﬁrms beneﬁt
from open standards, that takeovers have ambiguous welfare eﬀects and that simple licensing
schemes are welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
When developing an invention into a commercial product requires substantial resources, only a
few ﬁrms may be contenders for positions as ﬁrst-mover or second entrant in an industry. Along
with other key market characteristics like projected growth and volatility, the cost of innovation
relative to imitation is then a key determinant of investment strategies and the timing of product
introductions. Moreover, there exists substantial variation from one market to another both in
dynamic characteristics and in the conditions of imitation, which may themselves hinge on the use
that innovating ﬁrms make of IPRs. Firms accordingly respond to policy variables, like intellectual
property right (IPR) levels, that govern the conditions of innovation and imitation, whose choice
by regulators must therefore account for the dynamics of industry investments.
One market in which conditions of imitation and IPRs have played a prominent role is the
smartphone market. In the decade following the release of the ﬁrst iPhone in 2007, a broad in-
terpretation of IPRs allowed Apple to patent numerous aspects of its innovative products and
systematically engage in litigation against alleged imitation by its chief rival, Samsung. Many
other high-tech ﬁrms have pursued similarly aggressive strategies in their own markets (Galasso
[15]). In contrast with this, in the growing but still unpredictable market for lithium ion batteries,
electric-vehicle technology pioneer Tesla Motors announced in 2014 that it would open its base of
several hundreds of approved patents to competitors at no cost, an approach which is not so rare
historically in the early stages of new technologies (Bessen [1]). In the pharmaceutical industry,
considerable variation can be observed across business segments in both dynamic characteristics
and conditions of imitation, which shapes the strategies of the industry's major ﬁrms. Glaxo-
SmithKline for instance announced in 2016 that it would pursue a graduated approach to IPRs,
under which it would defend its patents in the mature markets of high-income economies but
would allow generic manufacturers to produce low-cost copies of its drugs in low-income markets
where demand grows faster but can be much more volatile (Phillips [28]). IPRs are known to
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the timing of innovations (drug launches) in this industry, with clear impli-
cations for welfare. Several recent empirical investigations have studied innovation timing, such
as Wagner and Wakeman [36], who ﬁnd that the number of patent applications (which can be
interpreted as an indirect measure of the cost of inventing around) for a given drug candidate is
positively correlated with the speed of product launch, and Cockburn et al. [7], who ﬁnd that more
extensive patent protection strongly accelerates the introduction of new drugs in a large number
of countries. The pharmaceutical sector is an important and well-documented enough industry
example that we will continue referring to it throughout the article in a series of detailed footnotes
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to the main text.
In a model of dynamic competition to develop a new product, we propose to study the eﬀect
of the relative costs of innovation and imitation on the investment strategies of ﬁrms when their
roles as innovator or imitator are endogenous and characterize the regulator's choice of optimal
IPR levels. By identifying the role played by the drift and volatility of product market demand on
the timing of innovative and imitative investments and hence on economic welfare, we contribute
novel insights concerning minimum IPR levels, the necessity of strong IPRs in mature industries,
and the role of dynamic competition between ﬁrms.
If innovation has positive spillovers for an imitator attrition may arise, and it is all the more
likely when demand growth and volatility are high. A socially optimal level of IPRs involves a
minimum cost of imitating that we identify. If demand growth and volatility are low, as typically
occurs in mature industries, we show that a high level of IPR protection which induces a preemp-
tion race constitutes a constrained welfare optimum in a broad range of situations. If demand
growth and volatility are suﬃciently low, it is even socially desirable to provide innovators with
complete protection and have strategic investment take the form of winner-take-all preemption, so
that dynamic competition is intense enough that the ﬁrms invest at the net present value thresh-
old. The endogeneity of innovation timing plays a key role in establishing these results, and we
show that a regulator who did not account for the full range of dynamic competition would run
the risk setting too weak a level of IPRs.
To establish these conclusions, we study the exercise of strategic growth options by two initially
identical ﬁrms pursuing the development of a product for a new market in which they are poten-
tial horizontal competitors.1 Development of innovative and imitative products requires diﬀering
stationary levels of irreversible investment which may or may not be related to the exploitation
of a single patent, and occurs in a context of market uncertainty as the scale of demand follows
a geometric Brownian motion.2 Both ﬁrms independently choose thresholds that determine the
timing of their investment in product development, which once performed yields an immediate
and perpetual proﬁt ﬂow whose level at any moment depends on the number of active ﬁrms.
We thus study a real option game,3 but depart from the standard model by introducing an ex-
post asymmetry through the diﬀering ﬁxed costs of innovation and imitation that ﬁrms face and
1Our focus on these industries is therefore complementary to research on cumulative innovation such as Green
and Scotchmer [18].
2We focus on market uncertainty rather than R&D uncertainty, which has been extensively studied by the patent
race literature (see e.g. Denicolò [9]).
3See Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [6] for a presentation of these games where ﬁrms balance the value of
retaining ﬂexibility in the face of uncertainty with the strategic incentive to invest early.
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by considering the full range of relative ﬁxed costs. Our model therefore allows just as well for
broad IPRs implying a relatively high cost of imitation and preemption between ﬁrms as well as
for signiﬁcant spillovers resulting in a comparatively low cost of imitation and attrition between
ﬁrms.
The imitation cost provides us with a way to parametrize ﬁrst- and second-mover advantage
parsimoniously and to nest within a single framework two important timing games, the war of
attrition (Hendricks et al. [20]) and preemption (Fudenberg and Tirole [14]).4 The timing game
we study involves ﬁrms choosing investment thresholds, or hurdle rates, that determine stochastic
investment times, and has a straightforward normal form. We characterize the unique symmetric
equilibrium in investment threshold choices. This analysis provides the foundation for subsequent
welfare results which are the main focus of this paper, and we complement it with a more technical
discussion of closed-loop strategies in continuous time in the appendix.
After characterizing investment timing and discussing optimal imitation cost levels in a bench-
mark case with a predetermined sequence of investment decisions instead of dynamic competition
(Proposition 1), we derive the symmetric equilibrium timing of innovation with endogenous ﬁrm
roles for diﬀerent levels of the imitation cost and identify a critical imitation cost, K̂, which de-
termines whether strategic competition between ﬁrms takes the form of attrition or preemption
(Proposition 2). For extreme values of the cost of imitation, we ﬁnd that dynamic competition
has the form of a standard timing game. A very low imitation cost induces immediate imitation
and leads to a situation of attrition as ﬁrms seek to enter second, delaying product introduction.5
Conversely a very high imitation cost leads to a situation of preemption as ﬁrms seek to enter
ﬁrst and enjoy a phase of monopoly proﬁt before imitation occurs. Intermediate values of the
imitation cost result in hybrid forms of dynamic competition: a waiting game in which ﬁrm in-
vestment thresholds are continuously distributed over a disconnected support if the imitation cost
is moderately low, and a preemption race in which an attrition phase occurs oﬀ the equilibrium
path if the imitation cost is moderately high.
Provided that innovation has positive spillovers attrition may occur, and it is more likely if
there is a low degree of product market competition or if market growth and volatility are high
(Proposition 3). This is because high growth and volatility raise the option value of delaying
4The extension of these games to the stochastic case itself presents a number of challenges (Thijssen et al. [34],
Steg and Thijssen [32]).
5Our model thus encompasses the dynamics described by Scherer (quoted in Fudenberg and Tirole [14]) as each
industry member holding back initiating its R&D eﬀort in the fear that rapid imitation by others will be encouraged,
more than wiping out its innovative proﬁts.
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investment, eventually compensating for the lost monopoly proﬁt phase if a ﬁrm enters second
and imitates instead of innovating. A key additional result concerns the optimal balance between
ﬁrst- and second-mover advantage from the standpoint of the industry. Under both attrition and
preemption, positional rents are dissipated in the symmetric equilibrium and expected industry
value is therefore maximized if the imitation cost attains the critical level K̂ at which there is
neither a war of attrition nor a preemption race, so that ﬁrms do not compete for positional rents
by either unduly waiting or rushing to innovate (Proposition 4).
Because of the tractability of the equilibrium we characterize, we are able to study socially
optimal IPR levels if a regulator adjusts the cost incurred by an imitator through either legislative
measures or enforcement.6 With dynamic competition the welfare trade-oﬀ associated with raising
the imitation cost is more involved than a straight balancing of the incentive to innovate against
the deadweight loss of monopoly, as the eﬀect of higher imitation cost on the timing of imita-
tion is ambiguous under attrition. We identify a lower bound on the socially optimal imitation
cost (Proposition 5), which must provide suﬃcient quasi-rents for ﬁrms to avoid the Schererian
dynamics described in footnote 5 above.
Even if it is generally challenging to draw broad conclusions regarding optimal IPR levels, we
are able to show that if the static incentive to imitate is socially excessive, as occurs in a broad range
of oligopoly models, an imitation cost that induces preemption is optimal when market growth
and volatility are suﬃciently low (Proposition 6). The model therefore provides an argument for
strong IPRs in such industries based on objective characteristics of market uncertainty. In passing
we obtain closed-form expressions for the optimal threshold for innovation and the resulting level
of welfare under preemption (Lemma 1), establishing that a limit imitation cost level which results
in winner-take-all preemption is socially optimal when there is suﬃcient discounting. Moreover
we provide speciﬁc economic circumstances where the optimal imitation cost is consistent either
with attrition or preemption, such as a low consumer surplus from innovation or collusion in the
6Regulators have a broad array of speciﬁc measures at their disposal which aﬀect the cost of imitation. In the
pharmaceutical context for example, in the case of biologic-based drugs (i.e., large and complex molecules that
are typically produced with recombinant DNA technology), recent US legislation introduced under the Obama
Administration guarantees 12 years of data exclusivity. During this period, an imitating ﬁrm cannot refer to the
originator's clinical data in the regulatory ﬁlings for a generic version of an innovative product. In the words of
Branstetter, Chatterjee and Higgins [4], (p. 7):
With no way to establish bioequivalence, any generic version of a biologic-based drug would have
to undergo separate clinical trials to receive FDA approval  a barrier to entry so daunting that no
biosimilar has yet been introduced in the U.S. market.
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product market (Proposition 7).
These welfare results take on even more relevance when they are compared with the optimal
welfare levels derived without dynamic competition, as is often the case in the economic literature
on patents. A regulator following this kind of approach could be led to set the level of IPR
protection much too low, when in fact competition between ﬁrms to innovate plays a vital role
and is best incentivized with levels of imitation cost in the preemptive range (Proposition 8).
Finally we discuss several extensions of the model. First, we endogenize the cost of imitation by
allowing the innovator to pursue patent protection more aggressively or to make reverse engineering
of its product more diﬃcult. A higher baseline cost of imitation reduces the eﬀort exerted by
innovators to raise entry barriers, and ﬁrms are shown to gain from coordinating ex-ante not to
introduce subsequent complexity, a policy that may be thought of as an open standard (Proposition
9). We also discuss contracting between innovator and imitator that can take the form either of
a takeover or of a license agreement, and show that eﬃciency always increases in the latter case
(Proposition 10).
Our paper is related to early research on innovation incentives and optimal patents, and in
particular to Gallini [16] who introduces a cost of imitation that the regulator may use as a policy
instrument. We similarly emphasize the role of measures like patent breadth in determining the
cost of inventing around an existing innovation, but in contrast with this earlier work we account
for the endogenous timing of innovation and thus allow ﬁrms to wait before investing rather than
assuming that product development occurs when its net present value is positive. Denicolò [9]'s
model of optimal IPR protection in a patent race is therefore closer to our work, as it formalizes
innovation and imitation as the outcome of a non-cooperative interaction that precedes market
competition, though in contrast our model allows for second-mover advantage and attrition, which
likely arises in industries with high growth and volatility.
Our work is therefore also related to papers which study the eﬀect of second-mover advantage
on investment decisions, often as a result of explicit informational spillovers. Hoppe [23] allows for
uncertainty regarding the success of new technology adoption to beneﬁt a rival's innovation decision
whereas in Thijssen et al. [33] information regarding the value of a project arrives continuously over
time. Femminis and Martini [13] allow for a disclosure lag of random duration before the follower
receives the information. In these models, both preemption and attrition can occur depending
on the level of spillovers, but the welfare analysis is either based on pure strategy equilibrium or
restricted to preemption regimes. We analyze the welfare properties of symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium over a complete range of regimes, providing intuitive analytic results regarding optimal
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IPRs that are related to the dynamic properties of demand.
Our welfare results can be related to several papers that compare welfare across two key
alternative policy regimes, a strict winner-take-all regime where only the ﬁrst ﬁrm to innovate
receives a patent, and a more permissive regime where late investors are allowed to compete with
the ﬁrst before its patent expires. In La Manna, Macleod, and de Meza [25] ﬁrms spend a ﬁxed
initial amount in R&D that determines a probability of inventing at a future date. Simple cost
and demand conditions, such as constant returns to scale and a linear demand, are identiﬁed
for the permissive regime to be welfare superior. Henry [21] introduces a mechanism whereby a
late inventor can share the patent with the innovator within a given time period. When adjusted,
together with other policy instruments, this mechanism is socially beneﬁcial under mild conditions,
notably with a linear demand and quantity competition. However, in a model where ﬁrms incur a
ﬂow cost, in Denicolò and Franzoni [11] it is the strict patent regime that is found to be optimal
in a broad set of circumstances, in particular when demand is linear, product market competition
is weak, and duplication ﬂow costs are large. Our approach is broadly consistent with these
contributions, but we characterize an optimal degree of IPRs with the winner-take-all regime
occurring as a limit case rather than evaluating a discrete set of regimes. Moreover, the model of
investment under market uncertainty allows us to identify determinants of optimal protection that
are not considered in this stream of literature related to measurable properties of the dynamics of
markets.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies a benchmark case in which the roles of
ﬁrms are predetermined. Section 4 characterizes the symmetric equilibrium when ﬁrms engage in
dynamic competition. Section 5 studies welfare when a regulator determines the cost of imitation.
Section 6 discusses two extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 A model of new product development
This section sets up a model of strategic investment in product development that reﬂects the
characteristic features of innovation and imitation discussed in the introduction. The assumptions
concerning the economic environment are presented in Section 2.1 and the continuation payoﬀs
that ﬁrms obtain once innovation occurs are presented in Section 2.2.
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2.1 Assumptions
Two identical ﬁrms engage in dynamic competition to introduce substitutable versions of a novel
product in an evolving market. Organizational constraints prevent a ﬁrm from developing two
variants of the novel product and entry barriers shield both ﬁrms from other competitors.
Introduction of the product immediately generates a perpetual baseline proﬁt ﬂow for the ﬁrm,
whose value is piM if it operates as a monopoly or piD if both ﬁrms are active, with 0 < 2piD < piM
which means that imitation reduces industry proﬁts. A ﬁrm that introduces its product when no
other ﬁrm has yet done so is referred to as an innovator, and if a ﬁrm introduces its product after
its rival it is referred to as the imitator.
The baseline proﬁt ﬂow is scaled by a measure of market size Y (t), t ≥ 0. The total ﬂow
proﬁts active ﬁrms obtain at a given time are either piMY (t) or piDY (t). To capture the idea that
demand for the new product evolves in a context of market uncertainty, the measure of market size
is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion dY (t) = αY (t)dt+ σY (t)dW (t) where W (t) is
a standard Wiener process, and α and σ ≥ 0 are the drift and volatility. Both ﬁrms have the same
discount rate r. In order for the investment problems we study to be economically meaningful we
assume that α < r.
Product development involves an irreversible investment which encompasses standard setup
costs associated with bringing a product to market such as dedicated plant, equipment and mar-
keting expenses as well as the cost of developing the ﬁrm's product variant. The ﬁxed costs of
innovation and imitation are respectively denoted I and K. While I is assumed to be positive
and ﬁnite, the extreme cases K = 0 and K = ∞ are allowed and we are agnostic about the
relative magnitudes of I and K.7 If the second ﬁrm can develop an equivalent product completely
independently then K = I, whereas if there are positive spillovers K < I, and with scarce inputs
or IPR protection that compels imitators to invent around any intellectual property held by the
7Within the pharmaceutical industry for instance, the cost of imitation varies greatly across business segments.
The conditions of imitation for drugs are entirely diﬀerent from those for vaccines. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms rely on
intellectual property rights in order to increase the costs of imitators for new drugs which otherwise could be
copied more easily than products whose production processes can be kept secret, or for which the time and relative
expense needed to copy the invention are much higher (Scherer and Watal [35], p. 4). If such patent protection
is not available, a generic product can be introduced at a much lower ﬁxed cost than incurred by the branded
product supplier. However, this ease of imitation is not found in the case of vaccines, which are made from living
micro-organisms, and unlike drugs are not easily reverse-engineered, as the greatest challenges often lie in details
of production processes that cannot be inferred from the ﬁnal product, implying that there is technically no such
thing as a generic vaccine (Wilson [37], p. 13).
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innovator K > I can hold.8
We consider an industry that is at an early stage of market development, with Y (0) ≤
(r − α) I/piM . At such low market size, a monopoly ﬁrm would initially prefer to delay invest-
ment, and the same holds true for the duopoly ﬁrms whose investment decisions we study in the
subsequent sections.9
Finally, in order to derive our welfare results we suppose that like proﬁts, the baseline consumer
surplus ﬂows under monopoly and duopoly, sM and sD, with 0 < sM ≤ sD, are scaled by the
market size parameter Y (t), and that the social discount rate is equal to r. The static welfare gain
from imitation,
(
sD + 2piD
)− (sM + piM), plays a key role in our normative analysis. We assume
that this static welfare gain or social incentive for imitation is lower than the private incentive
for imitation piD, implying that sD + piD < sM + piM . A standard result in industrial economics
is that this assumption characterizes a broad range of oligopoly models (Mankiw and Whinston
[26]). A set of suﬃcient conditions on product market competition for it to hold is that entry
raise industry output, that it decrease the proﬁt of existing ﬁrms and that ﬁrms not price below
marginal cost.10
2.2 Continuation payoﬀs
Firms obtain continuation payoﬀs once innovation occurs which depend on their position in the
investment sequence. These payoﬀs are deﬁned for a given value y = Y (0) of the market size
process as functions of the market size at which innovation occurs, which is denoted Y and satisﬁes
Y ≥ y. They thus represent the current values of anticipated rather than instantaneous payoﬀs,
8Imperfect competition in the input market can also lead to asymmetric ﬁxed costs for initially identical ﬁrms.
Billette de Villemeur et al. [2] show for instance that if the cost of investment is determined endogenously by a
monopoly input supplier, the ﬁxed cost is lower for the ﬁrst ﬁrm that invests.
The ﬁxed cost asymmetry we posit can also be contrasted with Pawlina and Kort [27]'s model of dynamic
competition in an asymmetric duopoly. Similarly to our equilibrium characterization in Section 4, these authors
identify several types of equilibria which are parametrized parsimoniously by the degree of ex-ante (rather than
ex-post) asymmetry.
9If this condition is not satisﬁed, then immediate investment at Y (0) can arise as a solution to the decision
problems studied in Sections 3 and 4, and the equilibrium characterizations must be expanded to account for such
cases.
10The second condition is known as the business-stealing eﬀect, which holds by assumption in our model since
piD < piM and characterizes competition between ﬁrms producing substitute products in a broad range of industries.
In an empirical study of the hypertension drug market for example, Branstetter et al. [5] estimate the impact of
imitation (generic entry) on producer proﬁts and on consumer surplus ﬁnding only a modest positive eﬀect on social
welfare owing to the importance of the business stealing eﬀect (generic sales displace branded sales).
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and as in the literature they are denoted F , L and M according to whether a ﬁrm invests as a
follower, as a leader or if investments are simultaneous. In the terminology of the previous section,
the ﬁrst case corresponds to an imitator whereas the last two correspond to innovator ﬁrms, as we
rule out imitation with simultaneous investments.
The continuation payoﬀ of a follower is obtained by studying the decision problem of a ﬁrm
once its rival has innovated. It then holds a growth option on a duopoly market and its optimal
policy is to develop the imitative product whenever the market size reaches an exercise threshold
we denote by Y F . Standard arguments (see Appendix A.1) establish that if the current market
size is Y (t) = Y the instantaneous value of this option is
V D (Y ) = sup
τ≥t
EY
[∫ ∞
τ
piDY (s)e−rsds− e−rτK
]
=
{
AY β , Y < Y F
piD
r−αY −K, Y ≥ Y F
, (1)
where
Y F :=
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
K
is the exercise threshold, β is shorthand for the function of parameters
β (α, σ, r) :=
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(2)
and A := (K/ (β − 1)) [Y F ]−β is a constant. The discounting parameter (2) satisﬁes β > 1 and
∂β/∂α, ∂β/∂σ, −∂β/∂r < 0. The expected discounted value at time t = 0 of obtaining the
duopoly option V D (Y ) at Y when rival innovation occurs is accordingly
F (Y ) = Ey
[∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,Y F })
piDY (s)e−rsds− e−rτ(max{Y,Y F})K
]
=
 Ayβ , Y < Y F( piD
r−αY −K
) ( y
Y
)β
, Y ≥ Y F (3)
where in the ﬁrst line τ (Z) := inf { t ≥ 0|Y (t) ≥ Z} is the stochastic time at which the market
size process ﬁrst hits a threshold Z and Y F now represents the imitator (or follower) investment
threshold.11
11A standard property of β which is apparent in the continuation payoﬀs is that the expected discounted value
of a monetary unit received at the ﬁrst hitting time τ (Y ) of threshold Y ≥ y is Eye−rτ(Y ) = (y/Y )β . Note that
limσ→0 β = r/α.
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Given that the optimal policy of the follower is to invest once Y F is reached, the leader payoﬀ at
time t = 0 that a ﬁrm receives from innovating ﬁrst at a threshold Y is
L (Y ) = Ey
[∫ τ(max{Y,Y F})
τ(Y )
piMY (s)e−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I +
∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,Y F })
piDY (s)e−rsds
]
=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − piM − piD
r − α
yβ
[max {Y, Y F }]β−1
(4)
(see Appendix A.2). The ﬁrst summand in (4) corresponds to the discounted value of perpetual
monopoly proﬁts from innovation and the second corrects for the anticipated reduction in proﬁt
ﬂow stemming from imitation. Moreover, the ﬁrst summand is a strictly quasiconcave function of
Y , which attains its maximum at the standalone monopoly threshold
Y L :=
β
β − 1
r − α
piM
I.
If both ﬁrms invest together ﬁnally, at a market size threshold Y , the continuation payoﬀ from
simultaneous investments is
M (Y ) = Ey
[∫ ∞
τ(Y )
piDY (s)e−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I
]
=
(
piD
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β
. (5)
This payoﬀ is a strictly quasiconcave function of Y which attains its maximum at the threshold
YM :=
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
I,
which satisﬁes YM > Y L. The formulation ofM(Y ) incorporates simultaneous innovation so that
the ﬁxed cost is I for both ﬁrms, which can be due, say, to a lag for information spillovers to take
place ruling out the possibility of any imitation.12
3 Predetermined investment sequence
To get a ﬁrst insight about the dynamics of innovation and imitation in our model, we study
investment decisions when ﬁrm roles as leader or follower are exogenous. One way this situation
12An alternative assumption would be that ﬁxed costs are attributed randomly when investments are simultaneous
so the expected ﬁxed cost at the moment of investment is (I +K)/2. With this assumption, the ﬁrst intersection
of L(Y ) and M(Y ) is no longer at Y F and these two functions no longer overlap if I 6= K.
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can arise is through certain industrial policies, for example if a former state-run monopolist enjoys
priority market access in a deregulated industry. Besides its inherent interest this is a useful case
to examine from a theoretical standpoint, ﬁrst because it leads us to identify a critical imitation
cost level, K˜, which is referred to throughout the rest of our analysis, and second because the
equilibrium without dynamic competition that we derive in this section provides a benchmark to
assess the eﬀect of dynamic competition further below when we endogenize ﬁrm roles.
3.1 Industry equilibrium
Suppose without loss of generality that ﬁrm 1 develops its product ﬁrst whereas ﬁrm 2 must wait
for ﬁrm 1's variant to be introduced before developing its own. Let Yi, i ∈ {1, 2}, denote ﬁrm
i's investment threshold choice. Firm 2's threshold is therefore constrained to satisfy Y2 ≥ Y1.
With these assumptions the equilibrium pattern of investments is found by backward induction
as in a standard Stackelberg duopoly model. We therefore ﬁrst identify ﬁrm 2's optimal invest-
ment threshold, denoted Y F2 (Y1), and then ﬁrm 1's optimal forward-looking investment threshold,
denoted Y L1 .
Firm 2 solves the follower problem described at the beginning of Section 2.2. Given the
constraint that it faces, its optimal investment threshold is therefore Y F2 (Y1) = max
{
Y F , Y1
}
.
Firm 1 solves the problem maxY1≥y L(Y1), where the leader payoﬀ L(Y1) it obtains is given
by (4) which directly incorporates the reaction of ﬁrm 2. To solve this problem, observe that
the function L(Y ) is deﬁned piecewise. Since L(Y ) = M(Y ) for Y ≥ Y F , L(Y ) has a local
maximum over the range
[
Y F ,∞) at YM . If Y F > y, L(Y ) is strictly quasiconcave over [y, Y F ).
If Y L < Y F , which occurs for K >
(
piD/piM
)
I, then there is a ﬁrst local maximum of L(Y ) at
Y L. As K increases raising Y F , the ﬁrst piece of L(Y ) shifts upward continuously (intuitively,
a higher threshold Y F lengthens the leader's proﬁtable monopoly phase) raising the value of the
local maximum L
(
Y L
)
, whereas the second subfunction and the value of the other local maximum
M(YM ) are unaﬀected. For K =
(
piD/piM
)
I, Y F = Y L so L(Y L) = M(Y L) < M
(
YM
)
, whereas
limK→∞ L(Y L) = (I/ (β − 1))
(
y/Y L
)β
> (I/ (β − 1)) (y/YM)β = M (YM). Therefore, there
exists a unique solution in K to the condition L
(
Y L
)
= M
(
YM
)
, which we denote by K˜. Its
exact value is
K˜ =
β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
(
piM
piD
)β − 1

1
β−1
I
(see Appendix A.3.1). The critical imitation cost K˜ allows us to characterize the solution to ﬁrm
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1's problem: for K ≤ K˜, YM is a global maximum of L(Y ) whereas for K ≥ K˜, Y L is a global
maximum. For mathematical rigor, if ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent (for K = K˜) we assume that it invests
at the lower of the two thresholds. Therefore,
Y L1 =
{
YM , K < K˜
Y L, K ≥ K˜ .
With exogenous ﬁrm roles generating sequential threshold choices, ﬁrms invest at
(
Y L1 , Y
F
2
)
=(
YM , YM
)
(if K < K˜) or
(
Y L, Y F
)
(if K ≥ K˜). In the former case innovation occurs later (since
YM > Y L) and the outcome involves clustered investments even if ﬁrm 2 beneﬁts from a lower
ﬁxed cost as an imitator, whereas in the latter case innovation occurs earlier and there is a pattern
of diﬀusion in the industry.
3.2 Eﬃcient imitation cost and IPR levels
We next discuss the normative aspects of investment with exogenous roles from the successive
standpoints of the industry and of a regulator, who can in either case set the cost of imitation
subject to the constraint that ﬁrms thereby determine their investment thresholds in the sequence
that is exogenously imposed.
3.2.1 Industry optimum
As seen above, the level of the imitation cost determines the pattern of investments in the industry.
This cost in turn depends on technological conditions, but it can also be aﬀected by such measures
as ex-ante agreements regarding pooling of resources or common standards. It is possible therefore
to think of K as a decision variable in certain industries, and to inquire as to what level is optimal
from the industry's perspective.
Answering this question amounts to identifying the cost of imitation that maximizes the sum
of ﬁrm proﬁts V˜1+2 (K) := L
(
Y L1
)
+ F
(
Y L1
)
, that is to solving maxK∈R+ V˜1+2 (K). Substituting
Y L1 into the leader and follower continuation payoﬀs and simplifying, equilibrium industry proﬁt
is
V˜1+2 (K) =

(
β+1
β−1I −K
) ( y
YM
)β
, K < K˜
I
β−1
( y
Y L
)β − piM−2piDr−α yβ[Y F ]β−1 , K ≥ K˜ .
Industry proﬁt is a decreasing function of K over
(
0, K˜
)
, discontinuous at K˜, and increasing
over
(
K˜,∞
)
since piM > 2piD and Y F increases with K. It is straightforward to establish that
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V˜1+2 (0) < limK→∞ V˜1+2 (K). Therefore the optimal imitation cost from an industry standpoint
is K˜V = ∞, so that only ﬁrm 1 innovates. In such an industry, one would not see development
expenses being pooled or common standards being adopted.
3.2.2 Social optimum
The imitation cost can also be aﬀected by policy variables such as the level of IPR protection
chosen by regulators. We consider the second-best welfare benchmark here, in which ﬁrms are
free to select their entry thresholds according to the predetermined investment sequence deﬁned
earlier in the section.
The level of social welfare associated with given thresholds Y1 and Y2 is(
sM + piM
r − α Y1 − I
)(
y
Y1
)β
+
((
sD + 2piD
)− (sM + piM)
r − α Y2 −K
)(
y
Y2
)β
. (6)
Substituting for the equilibrium values of Y1 and Y2 and simplifying, the welfare second-best with
a predetermined investment sequence can be expressed as
W˜ (K) =

(
β
β−1
sD
piD
I + β+1β−1I −K
) ( y
YM
)β
, K < K˜(
β s
M
piM
+ 1
)
I
β−1
( y
Y L
)β
+
(
1− β (s
M+piM)−(sD+piD)
piD
)
K
β−1
( y
Y F
)β
, K ≥ K˜
.
W˜ (K) is decreasing forK < K˜, discontinuous at K˜, and monotonically decreasing or increasing for
K > K˜ depending on the level of β. For β > piD/
((
sM + piM
)− (sD + piD)), W˜ (K) is increasing
in this latter range and it there exists therefore a unique β˜ > 1 (see Appendix A.3.2) beyond which
the socially optimal imitation cost is K˜W = ∞, whereas otherwise K˜W ∈
{
0, K˜
}
. Intuitively,
large values of β are associated with a signiﬁcant amount of discounting, in which case the timing
of innovation becomes more important for welfare than deadweight loss from lower product market
competition, so that it becomes socially advantageous to induce earlier innovation by increasing
K to drive Y L1 to the lower threshold Y
L even if this comes at the expense of monopolization of
the product market.
To summarize the results with exogenous ﬁrm roles
Proposition 1 With a predetermined sequence of moves, investments are clustered at YM if K <
K˜ and diﬀused over Y L and Y F if K ≥ K˜. The imitation cost K˜V = ∞ is eﬃcient for the
industry, and socially optimal if there is suﬃcient discounting (if β ≥ β˜).
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4 Endogenous innovation and imitation
Suppose the roles of ﬁrms as innovator or imitator are not predetermined but instead result
from dynamic competition. A non-cooperative timing game therefore determines the sequence of
investments. Firms choose innovative investment thresholds that they can update as imitators in
a non-strategic continuation phase if rival innovation occurs. Industry dynamics typically consist
of a period of inaction before either ﬁrm has developed the product over which the strategic
interaction plays out, followed possibly by a monopoly phase and a duopoly phase once both
ﬁrms have developed their own variants of the product. The game is described in Section 4.1,
equilibrium in Section 4.2 and the eﬀect of imitation cost on equilibrium thresholds and payoﬀs is
discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Firm strategies and payoﬀs
The strategy of ﬁrm i, i = 1, 2, consists of a threshold Yi ∈ [y,∞] that triggers its investment
when reached for the ﬁrst time. Strategies are chosen at time zero to determine the stochastic
time at which each ﬁrm plans to invest, assumed to be a ﬁrst hitting time, and thus the timing
of innovation in the industry. Once innovation occurs any remaining ﬁrm revises its investment
threshold in the continuation phase which determines when imitation occurs.13
To describe the investment game the strategies Y1 and Y2 must be mapped into outcomes.
For Y1 6= Y2 this is straightforward, since one of the ﬁrms is the leader and obtains the payoﬀ
L (min {Y1, Y2}) while the other is therefore the follower and obtains the payoﬀ F (min {Y1, Y2}).
For Y1 = Y2 however, taking the outcome to consist of simultaneous investments with payoﬀs
M(Yi) for each ﬁrm does not correctly represent economic behavior if payoﬀs satisfy L (Yi) ≥
F (Yi) > M (Yi), i = 1, 2, i.e. if both ﬁrms seek to invest whereas it would be optimal for
only one to do so. Such cases arise typically in preemption games, and in the discrete time
mixed strategy equilibrium that continuous time approximates, investments in fact turn out to be
partially coordinated. A standard solution in the literature is to have players use an extension of
mixed strategies, known as simple strategies, which appends an intensity function to each player's
threshold distributions in order to describe their probabilistic behavior when making simultaneous
investment attempts (Fudenberg and Tirole [14], Thijssen et al. [34], see also Appendix B).
13This ability of ﬁrms to update their thresholds when rival investment occurs is the main diﬀerence with Rein-
ganum [29]'s technology adoption game with open-loop strategies in which ﬁrms remain committed to their initial
threshold choice as outcomes unfold.
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For simplicity, we follow an alternative approach in this section which consists in positing a
probabilistic tie-breaking rule for such simultaneous investment attempts. This rule is calibrated to
yield payoﬀs that are consistent with the symmetric equilibrium using extended mixed strategies,
and notably satisfy the same rent-dissipation property.
If Y1 = Y2 = Y we therefore assume that either ﬁrm innovates ﬁrst with probability
14
p (Y ) =
{
F (Y )−M(Y )
L(Y )+F (Y )−2M(Y ) , Y < Y
F and L (Y ) ≥ F (Y )
0, otherwise
(7)
and simultaneous investments accordingly occur with probability 1− 2p (Y ).
With these assumptions the payoﬀ of ﬁrm i is
V (Yi, Y−i) =

L (Yi) , Yi < Y−i
p (Yi)L (Yi) + p (Yi)F (Yi) + (1− 2p (Yi))M (Yi) , Yi = Y−i
F (Y−i) , Yi > Y−i
(8)
and the normal form of the investment game is
({1, 2} , [y,∞)× [y,∞) , (V, V )) .
A Nash equilibrium of the investment game is a pair of strategies
(
Ŷ1, Ŷ2
)
such that V
(
Ŷi, Ŷ−i
)
≥
V
(
Yi, Ŷ−i
)
for all Yi ≥ y, i ∈ {1, 2}. In the next subsection, we describe the unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium, which can involve pure or mixed strategies, establishing the formal structure nec-
essary for the subsequent welfare results. Because by construction the payoﬀ function V (Yi, Y−i)
encapsulates outcomes of an equilibrium with mixed strategy extensions, the equilibrium obtained
in the static investment game of this section is consistent with the continuous time games in
closed-loop strategies in the literature. We verify this by studying a dynamic version of the game
in the appendix, which does not pose novel diﬃculties but is more notationally costly.
4.2 Equilibrium
The nature of the timing game that ﬁrms play depends on the relative positions of F (Y ) and
L(Y ), which is governed by the level of the imitation cost K.
14Observe that in the ﬁrst line the investment probability solves the condition pL (Y )+pF (Y )+(1− 2p)M(Y ) =
F (Y ) so ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between the expected payoﬀ from investing at the threshold Y and the follower payoﬀ
from postponing investment.
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For K = 0, imitation is free and immediate so L (Y ) < F (Y ) for all Y ≥ y. A higher value
of K shifts the imitation payoﬀ F (Y ) downward and raises the threshold Y F at which imitation
occurs, which lengthens any monopoly phase and raises the payoﬀ L(Y ) to innovating ﬁrst over[
y, Y F
]
. There exists a unique K that solves L
(
Y L
)
= F
(
Y F
)
, which we denote K̂. Its exact
value is
K̂ =
(
β
piM
piD
− (β − 1)
) 1
β−1 (piM
piD
)− β
β−1
I
(see Appendix A.4), and K̂ ∈
(
K˜, I
)
. For higher imitation cost levels K > K̂, the set of market
size thresholds over which ﬁrms strictly prefer innovating ﬁrst, P := {Y ≥ y|L (Y ) > F (Y )}, is
non-empty. Intuitively therefore, for lower levels of K (for K < K̂) a ﬁrm that imitates always
enjoys a second-mover advantage whereas for higher levels of K (for K > K̂) a ﬁrm can obtain
a ﬁrst-mover advantage if it innovates ﬁrst at a threshold Yi ∈ P. In the former case, the timing
game between ﬁrms takes the form of a waiting game, whereas in the latter case it is a preemption
game over the set P, which is referred to as the preemption range. If K > K̂, it is useful to deﬁne
Y P := inf P, which is known as the preemption threshold.
Taken together, the imitation cost levels, K˜, K̂ and I delimit four continuation payoﬀs con-
ﬁgurations, represented in Figures 1− 4, which reveal the nature of the timing game for diﬀerent
levels of the imitation cost:15
K ≤ K˜ (Figure 1). In this case F (Y ) > L (Y ) for all Y ≥ y (since K < K̂), and YM is the
global maximum of L(Y ) (since K < K˜). Innovating ﬁrst at any threshold Yi < Y
M is dominated
by innovating at YM , and over
[
YM ,∞) L(Y ) (= M(Y )) decreases so the investment game
constitutes a standard war of attrition.16
K˜ < K < K̂ (Figure 2). In this case F (Y ) > L (Y ) for all Y ≥ y (since K < K̂), but Y L is the
global maximum of L(Y ) (since K > K˜), and L(Y ) is not monotone over
[
Y L,∞) since it has a
local maximum at YM . Firms therefore engage in a war of attrition which is non-standard. In a
symmetric equilibrium innovation thresholds are continuously distributed over a support consisting
of the set of market sizes over which L(Y ) decreases,
[
Y L, sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )}] ∪
[YM ,∞) (intuitively it can be useful to think of attrition as occurring over a decreasing envelope
of L(Y ) for Y ≥ Y L, given by L̂(Y ) := sup {L (Z)|Z ≥ Y }).
15The pivotal cases K ∈
{
K˜, K̂, I
}
which are not shown are straightforward to obtain from those that are shown
by continuity of F (Y ) and L(Y ) in K.
16Figure 1 is drawn assuming K > (piD/piM )I so YF > YL. Otherwise F (Y ) is decreasing over (y,∞) but the key
properties described in the text still hold.
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K̂ ≤ K < I (Figure 3). In this case, the preemption range is non-empty (K = K̂ is a limiting
case). Firms therefore race to innovate ahead of one another over any threshold Yi ∈ P and in
symmetric equilibrium a single ﬁrm innovates at Y P (or Y L in the limiting case K = K̂). This
preemption race has a non-standard feature, due to the endogenous asymmetry between innovator
and imitator ﬁxed costs. Since supP < Y F , oﬀ the equilibrium path ﬁrms would engage in a war
of attrition if the threshold supP is reached and no ﬁrm has yet invested.
K ≥ I (Figure 4). In this case (which by continuity encompasses a standard preemption game
for K = I), the innovator payoﬀ L (Y ) lies above F (Y ) for all Y ∈ (Y P , Y F ), and in symmetric
equilibrium a single ﬁrm innovates at Y P .
The investment game has several Nash equilibria involving either pure or mixed strategies. We
assume that there are no coordinating mechanisms available so that the ﬁrms, being symmetric
ex-ante, play the same strategies.17 Moreover, the resulting equilibrium leads to a compelling
relationship between industry outcomes and imitation cost. We therefore focus on the unique
symmetric equilibrium, consistently with Fudenberg and Tirole [14]'s study of preemption and
with the discussion of attrition in Hendricks et al. [20].
Y L
F
L
Y F
L(YM )
F (Y F )
YM
L(Y L)
Y
Figure 1
Y L
L(Y L) F
L
Y F YM
F (Y F )
L(YM )
Y
Figure 2
1
Figure 1 (K ≤ K˜)  Innovation thresholds are distributed over [YM ,∞), and imitation occurs
immediately after, for an equilibrium value E(V ) = L(YM ).
17In a similar model of investment with spillovers Hoppe [23] focuses on asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
under attrition. Her analysis applies for instance if the ﬁrms have multimarket contact that allows investments to
be coordinated across markets.
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Figure 2 (K˜ < K < K̂)  Innovation thresholds are distributed over the disconnected support[
Y L, sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )}] ∪ [YM ,∞), and imitation occurs either at Y F if the in-
novation threshold is in
[
Y L, sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )}], or immediately otherwise, for an
equilibrium value E(V ) = L(Y L).
Y L
F (Y F ) F
L
Y FY P YM
L(Y L)
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Y
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2
Figure 3 (K̂ ≤ K < I)  Innovation occurs at Y P and imitation at Y F , for an equilibrium value
E(V ) = F (Y F ). There is attrition oﬀ the equilibrium path if the threshold supP is reached and
no ﬁrm has yet invested.
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Figure 4 (K ≥ I)  Innovation occurs at Y P and imitation at Y F , for an equilibrium value
E(V ) = F (Y F ).
The threshold at which innovation occurs in equilibrium, Y := min
{
Ŷ1, Ŷ2
}
, is described in
the next proposition. This threshold is either a random variable if there is attrition (case (i)),
or takes the values Y P if preemption occurs (case (ii)) or Y L if neither preemption nor attrition
occur (case (iii)) (see Appendix A.4 for proof).
Proposition 2 In the symmetric equilibrium of the investment game,
(i) (attrition) if K < K̂ equilibrium is in mixed strategies distributed continuously over
[
YM ,∞)
if K ≤ K˜ and [Y L, sup{Z < YM ∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )}] ∪ [YM ,∞) if K˜ < K < K̂;
(ii) (preemption) if K > K̂ equilibrium is in pure strategies and the innovation threshold is Y P ;
(iii) if K = K̂ equilibrium is in pure strategies and the innovation threshold is Y L.
Given the equilibrium threshold for innovation, the optimal follower behavior described in
Section 2.2 determines the imitation threshold. Letting y denote the realization of Y , imitation
therefore occurs immediately in case (i) if y ≥ YM , or at Y F and with a lag in case (i) if y < YM
or in cases (ii) and (iii).
The pivotal imitation cost level that separates attrition and preemption satisﬁes K̂ < I, so
a lower imitation cost is necessary but not suﬃcient for a second mover advantage to exist and
attrition to occur. Too see why, consider an industry in which K = I. In such an industry a
ﬁrst-mover that invests optimally earns additional monopoly proﬁts until the market size process
hits Y F . In order for a second-mover advantage to arise and ﬁrms to be willing to wait, the cost
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of imitation must be suﬃciently low to compensate the second mover for forgoing this monopoly
rent. In practice therefore a lower cost for imitators, which constitutes the most likely situation
absent IPRs, does not itself ensure that ﬁrms have a second-mover advantage or that they will
ﬁnd it desirable to pursue so-called imitation strategies.
Because the strategic interaction depends on the position of the imitation cost K relative to K̂,
the comparative statics of this threshold reveal the eﬀect that the main industry parameters, the
intensity of product market competition (piM/piD) and the characteristics of the demand process
(α and σ), have on the nature of the timing game.
Proposition 3 The more intense product market competition is and the lower are drift and volatil-
ity, the more likely it is that preemption occurs, and conversely for attrition:
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
< 0,
∂K̂
∂α
,
∂K̂
∂σ
> 0.
To provide intuition for the last inequality, recall that because of market uncertainty there
is an option value from waiting. So long as that there is an inherent advantage to imitation
(K < I), then for large enough levels of drift and volatility such that K < K̂, this option
value outweighs any preemptive motive to secure monopoly rents. That is to say, an attrition
regime is more likely in industries with greater trend growth and demand volatility.18 This is an
important observation in our framework, because it identiﬁes a countervailing force to several
mechanisms that are highlighted in the rest of the paper. As the next sections show, ﬁrm choices
regarding technology or licensing and regulator choices of IPR levels generally make dynamic
competition more preemptive. One therefore expects attrition to occur relatively rarely, except in
those industries in which market uncertainty is signiﬁcant.
18One example of real-world conditions that might ﬁt such a framework is the following. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms
face market conditions that impact product introductions and that can vary signiﬁcantly across geographic areas. In
low- and middle-income countries, economic and demographic drivers often imply high demand growth, but political
instability can also result in less demand predictability than in high-income economies, and thus discourage the
industry from introducing new treatments or preventives. Managers of big pharmaceutical companies are very aware
of such market characteristics, and emphasize that although pharmaceutical markets in key emerging economies,
such as China, India, and Brazil, are expanding at rates of more than 12 percent per year (...) uncertain demand,
and political and economic instability in some countries have deterred private investors for decades (Witty [38],
pp. 118 and 124).
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4.3 Imitation cost and industry outcomes
The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 involves several intuitive relationships between the
cost of imitation and the dynamic pattern of investments and ﬁrm proﬁtability which we describe
here successively.
4.3.1 Thresholds
From the expression of Y F it directly follows that a higher imitation cost raises the standalone
duopoly threshold. However raising Y F does not by itself imply that imitation is delayed in equi-
librium at least in an attrition regime, since innovation and hence imitation occur at a stochastic
threshold beyond Y F with positive probability. The eﬀect of imitation cost on innovation and
innovation timing must therefore be studied more carefully.
To begin with, there is an inverse relationship between the cost of imitation and the innovation
threshold. Under preemption, it is straightforward to establish that ∂Y F /∂K < 0. Under attri-
tion, the distribution of innovator entry thresholds is shifted leftward so the innovation threshold
Y decreases stochastically.
The relationship between the cost of imitation and the imitation threshold, which is monotone
under preemption since ∂Y F /∂K > 0, is again more involved under attrition. Indeed in the waiting
game a higher imitation cost results in a higher imitation threshold if the innovation threshold
realization is low so that there is a positive lag between innovation and imitation (y ≤ Y F ).
However if the realization of the innovation threshold is high (y > Y F ), imitation occurs right
after innovation, so its distribution is accordingly also shifted leftward by an increase in the cost
of imitation to the right of Y F . Therefore a higher imitation cost delays imitation if innovation
occurs early, but indirectly hastens imitation if innovation occurs late. A better measure of the
speed of imitation is therefore the gap between innovation and imitation thresholds, which under
attrition is equal to max
{
Y F ,Y
}− Y and is nondecreasing in K.
In the model, changes in imitation cost therefore have a monotonic eﬀect on both the innovation
threshold and the imitation lag. An increase in imitation cost thus accelerates innovation and
delays the arrival of imitation conditional upon innovation having occurred.
4.3.2 Equilibrium payoﬀs
There also exists a useful equilibrium relationship between imitation cost and industry perfor-
mance. Observe ﬁrst that because under attrition and preemption competition between ﬁrms to
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secure second- or ﬁrst-mover advantage results in the dissipation of positional rents, equilibrium
ﬁrm values have straightforward expressions. In an attrition regime, the equilibrium ﬁrm value is
L
(
Y L
)
= M
(
YM
)
over
[
0, K˜
]
, L
(
Y L
)
over
[
K˜, K̂
]
and F
(
Y F
)
over
[
K̂,∞
)
. Moreover viewed
as functions of the cost of imitation, M
(
YM
)
is constant, L
(
Y L
)
is increasing and F
(
Y F
)
is
decreasing over the interiors of the relevant ranges. Industry value is therefore nondecreasing in
K up until K̂ and decreasing thereafter, and we can conclude that it is at this level where neither
attrition nor preemption occur that industry value is maximized, as ﬁrms do not have an incentive
to dissipate resources by seeking a positional advantage of either sort.
Proposition 4 The expected industry value with endogenous ﬁrm roles is
V̂1+2 (K) = min
{
F
(
Y F
)
,max
{
L
(
Y L
)
,M
(
YM
)}}
which is quasiconcave, constant over
(
0, K˜
)
and has a unique maximum at K̂V = K̂.
In economic terms, Proposition 4 establishes that starting from a zero imitation cost, ﬁrms
beneﬁt ex-ante from raising the ﬁxed cost of imitation above K˜ so as to shield an innovator
with positive probability from instantaneous imitation. Moreover, and despite possibly wasteful
duplicative ﬁxed costs ex-post, raising imitation cost for the second ﬁrm even further to K̂ is
beneﬁcial for the industry when the endogenous timing of investments is accounted for.
Aside from providing an intuitive characterization of industry value, Proposition 4 is instru-
mental in the next section in establishing several of the welfare results.
5 Normative analysis
The previous section showed how the nature of the timing game (attrition or preemption) and
the dynamics of innovation and imitation are related to the cost of imitation. The social welfare
generated by the innovative and imitative products is therefore determined by regulatory choices
which aﬀect imitation cost. In this section, we seek to identify socially optimal levels of imitation
cost in a second-best framework where regulators set the cost of imitation while ﬁrms freely
determine the timing of their investments. At ﬁrst glance this question might seem to just involve a
classic trade-oﬀ between the reward of innovation and the dynamic deadweight loss from monopoly,
since a higher imitation cost prima facie raises the optimal threshold for imitation. However as
seen in Section 4.3.1, imitation does not necessarily occur at an optimal threshold so an increase
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in imitation cost has an ambiguous eﬀect on the timing of imitation in an attrition regime, and
the optimal imitation cost therefore needs to be studied more carefully.
For our welfare analysis, it is useful to express the social welfare function (6) in terms of
producer surplus and the consumer surpluses due to innovation and imitation. Its value in a free
entry equilibrium is
Ŵ (K) = 2 min
{
F
(
Y F
)
,max
{
L
(
Y L
)
,M
(
YM
)}}
+
sMyβ
r − αEyY
−(β−1) +
(
sD − sM) yβ
r − α Ey
[
max
{
Y , Y F
}]−(β−1)
. (9)
The ﬁrst summand in (9) is expected industry value, which by Proposition 4 is constant for
K < K˜ and strictly quasiconcave with a maximum at K̂. The second term is the expected
consumer surplus due to innovative investment. This term is monotonically increasing in K since
a higher imitation cost shifts the distribution of innovation thresholds leftward. The third term is
the expected consumer surplus due to the imitator's entry whose relationship with K is ambiguous
under attrition, since it is the lag between innovation and imitation and not the timing of imitation
itself that increases monotonically with K.
The function W (K) does not have a closed-form expression over its entire range. However
its value over
[
0, K̂
]
has an intuitive bound and there is a semi-closed form over
[
K̂,∞
)
whose
maximum value we are able to calculate, so several properties of the social optimum can be derived
(See appendix for proofs of the following propositions and lemmas).
First, the socially optimal imitation cost has a positive lower bound:
Proposition 5 If the order of investments is endogenous, the socially optimal cost of imitation
satisﬁes K̂W ≥ K˜.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The ﬁrst term (producer surplus) in the welfare
function is constant over
[
0, K˜
]
(by Proposition 4) and the second term (consumer surplus from
innovation) is increasing since a higher imitation cost accelerates innovation, so only the third
term (consumer surplus from imitation) requires more careful consideration. However if K ≤ K˜
the innovation threshold is distributed over
[
YM ,∞), and imitation occurs immediately after
innovation. Within this range an increase in imitation cost indirectly accelerates imitation, which
unambiguously increases the consumer surplus from imitation.
It is therefore never optimal to set the cost of imitation at zero. Rather, it must be suﬃciently
high so that an innovator expects a phase of monopoly proﬁts with positive probability provided
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that he innovates at a low enough threshold. Conversely a ﬁrm that wins the timing game by
being more patient than its rival should accordingly pay a minimum price to develop its imitative
product, so that the industry avoids the Schererian dynamics described in the introduction. Even
if one adheres to the view that IPRs should be abolished altogether (see Boldrin and Levine [3]),
it is nevertheless important to ascertain that the cost of imitation meets such a threshold.19
Second, the positive lower bound of the socially optimal imitation cost can be tightened further
if an intuitive condition is met and there is suﬃcient discounting. The next proposition thus
provides a rigorous foundation for strong IPRs based on their dynamic characteristics, under the
assumption that the static private imitation incentive is socially excessive (piD >
(
sD + 2piD
) −(
sM + piM
)
) which characterizes many standard oligopoly models (see Section 2.1).
Proposition 6 If the order of investments is endogenous, the socially optimal cost of imitation
satisﬁes K̂W ≥ K̂ provided that the static private entry incentive is socially excessive and β is
suﬃciently large.
The proposition establishes that the drift and volatility of market size, through their eﬀect on
the discounting parameter β, play a key role in identifying which type of dynamic competition is
socially optimal. Speciﬁcally, it is in those industries for which drift and volatility are not too large
that IPR protection should be set suﬃciently high for competition between ﬁrms to be preemptive,
whereas the issue of optimal IPR levels remains an open question if the drift and volatility are
signiﬁcant.20
The proposition is established by means of two lemmas.
19In practice the lower bound K˜ can be used to assess initiatives like those in the pharmaceutical industry to
reduce the relative cost of imitation and encourage generic competition. In low- and middle-income countries, often
characterized by a rapidly expanding and highly uncertain demand which makes attrition more likely (Proposition
3), optimal social welfare in the local market may indeed involve low IPRs and attrition but in all cases requires
that a suﬃcient level of protection be maintained so that there remains a window of market sizes in which an
innovator entering suﬃciently early is incentivized by a period of monopoly proﬁts.
For example, in order to increase access to antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV infection in the developing world, over
the last decades political mobilization has facilitated the production of generic versions of the medicines patented
in developed countries (Hoen et al. [22]), which is consistent with our analysis above.
20For instance for orphan drugs and rare disease development, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration enacted
an enhanced form of IPR protection (Orphan Drug Exclusivity) together with a tax credit that lowers the costs
of clinical trials (Grabowski et al. [17]). To the extent that such markets are characterized by low growth and
volatility, our analysis oﬀers theoretical support to such regulatory measures.
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Lemma 1 Ŵ (K) has a unique maximum over
[
K̂,∞
]
and there exists β̂ > 1 such that the
socially optimal innovation threshold over this range is
Ŷ WP =
{
1
1+ψY
L, β < β̂
r−α
piM
I, β ≥ β̂ , where ψ :=
sM
piM
(
piM
piD
− β−1β
)
2
β +
sD−sM
piD
.
Although we do not have an expression for the socially optimal imitation cost itself, the
lemma gives an exact expression for the optimal innovation threshold if ﬁrms play a game of
preemption (even though preemption thresholds do not themselves have a closed form generally).
This optimal innovation threshold lies between the break-even threshold (r − α) I/piM and the
standalone monopoly threshold Y L, and since ψ is increasing in β, when β is large enough the
optimum is a corner solution that involves setting an arbitrarily high imitation cost K̂W = ∞.
Imitation then never occurs and instead ﬁrms race to enter in winner-take-all preemption, the
timing of the monopoly innovation having been driven to the competitive level by the threat of
potential entry.
The exact form of the preemption threshold given in Lemma 1 allows the local maximum of
Ŵ (K) over
[
K̂,∞
]
to be evaluated. There is no corresponding expression for the maximum value
of Ŵ (K) over
[
0, K̂
]
, but if the static private entry incentive is socially excessive then the third
term in the welfare function has an intuitive bound involving the proﬁts of the imitating ﬁrm,
and the values of social welfare over the two diﬀerent ranges can be compared, establishing the
proposition.
Lemma 2 If the static private imitation incentive is socially excessive, then K̂W ≥ K̂ if
sM
piM
≥ Ω (β) , where Ω (β) := 3
2β
((
β
β−1
)β−1 − 1) .
The function Ω (β) is decreasing in β with limβ→∞ Ω (β) = 0, so Lemma 2 establishes that
with suﬃcient discounting (i.e. suﬃciently low drift and volatility) the optimal level of social
welfare lies in the range over which dynamic competition is preemptive.
The previous two lemmas provide suﬃcient conditions, both for high IPRs to be socially
optimal (sM/piM ≥ Ω (β)) and, provided that this is the case, for optimal IPRs to result in
winner-take-all preemption (β ≥ β̂).21 For several standard product market speciﬁcations that
21It is useful for the examples in the text to note that β̂ is the upper root of
β2
sM
piM
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
+ β
(
2
sM
piM
− s
D
piD
)
− s
M
piM
− 2 = 0
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satisfy the excess static private entry incentive restriction in the proposition, these conditions are
straightforward to verify.
Example 1 (linear demand) Suppose that the product market is characterized by a linear inverse
demand P = A − BQ, A,B > 0 and that ﬁrms have constant unit variable cost c. Then after
normalizing by (A− c)2 /B, product market outcomes are (sM , sD, piM , piD) = (1/8, 2/9, 1/4, 1/9).
Solving sM/piM = 0.5 = Ω (β) numerically gives the threshold for K̂W ≥ K̂ as β ≈ 2.5692. With
these values, β̂ is the upper root of 5β2− 8β − 20 = 0 which gives β̂ ≈ 2.9541 as the threshold for
winner-take-all preemption.
Example 2 (isoelastic demand) Suppose that the product market is characterized by an isoelastic
inverse demand P = AQ−1/ε, A > 0, ε > 1, and that ﬁrms have constant unit variable cost c.
Then product market outcomes satisfy sM/piM = ε/ (ε− 1), sD/piD = 4ε/ (ε− 1) and piM/piD =
4 (2 (ε− 1) / (2ε− 1))ε−1. The threshold for the condition sM/piM = ε/ (ε− 1) = Ω (β) to hold
for all ε is β ≈ 1.7201. With these values, β̂ is the upper root of
β2
(
4
(
2 (ε− 1)
2ε− 1
)ε−1
− 1
)
− 2β −
(
3− 2
ε
)
= 0,
which gives
β̂ =
1 +
√
1 +
(
3− 2ε
)(
4
(
2(ε−1)
2ε−1
)ε−1 − 1)
4
(
2(ε−1)
2ε−1
)ε−1 − 1 .
This is an increasing function of ε, with limε→∞ β̂ =
(
1 +
√
1 + 3
(
4e−1/2 − 1)) / (4e−1/2 − 1) ≈
2.3122, which therefore gives the threshold for winner-take-all preemption in the social optimum
for all ε.
Further welfare results can be obtained in speciﬁc cases:
Proposition 7 If the order of investments is endogenous then
(i) if the consumer surplus from innovation is suﬃciently small (sM ≈ 0), then K˜ < K̂W < K̂;
(ii) if there is collusion in the product market (sD + 2piD = sM + piM ), then K̂W ≥ K̂.
Part (i) complements the previous results of the section by showing that there exist conditions
under which values of the imitation cost in the attrition range constitute a social optimum. This
is not obvious a priori since there is no closed form expression for Ŵ (K) over this range, but it
(see Appendix A.7).
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is nevertheless possible to show that lim
K→K̂− Ŵ
′(K) < 0. Intuitively, in this case the innovator
does not contribute measurably to the consumer surplus and producer surplus is locally insensitive
to imitation cost at K̂. Therefore, decreasing imitation cost from K̂ incentivizes imitation and
improves welfare. Part (ii) reﬂects the opposite situation, where imitator entry does not aﬀect
consumer surplus because of collusion in the product market. Then only innovation contributes to
social welfare, and the role of imitation cost is to incentivize innovation in a preemption regime.
We complete our analysis by comparing welfare levels we identify with endogenous innovation
with those obtained in Section 3 where the investment sequence is predetermined. Provided
that sM/piM ≥ Ω (β) we can evaluate the innovation threshold and the optimal welfare level
(Lemma 1), and we have shown that for suﬃciently large β (for β ≥ max
{
β˜, β̂
}
) a prohibitive
imitation cost is optimal both if roles are predetermined and if roles are endogenous, generating
either a contestable monopoly or winner-take-all preemption. A regulator may then compare both
of these alternatives, and assess the beneﬁts that stem from inducing dynamic competition. A
straightforward calculation establishes that dynamic competition raises welfare in this case, so
fostering dynamic competition to innovate ﬁrst is a valuable policy instrument in such industries.
This is not always the case though, and in industries in which a lower imitation cost K̂W ∈
(
K˜, K̂
)
is optimal (see Proposition 7 for an example), dynamic competition lowers welfare because it
induces attrition, delaying the onset of consumer surplus ﬂows without raising ﬁrm proﬁts.
Proposition 8 If β is suﬃciently large, it is optimal to induce dynamic competition in the form
of winner-take-all preemption.
Observe moreover that the optimal imitation cost levels are sensitive to whether ﬁrm roles are
predetermined or endogenous, taking values K˜W ∈
{
0, K˜,∞
}
in the former case while lying over
a connected range K̂W ∈
[
K˜,∞
]
in the latter. This is a particularly relevant consideration because
the patent design literature generally takes the value of innovation as given without endogenizing
its timing which can result in a starkly diﬀerent prescription regarding imitation cost,22 illustrating
the importance of accounting for industry dynamics.
22Admittedly with either perfect competition or monopoly instead of duopoly, the timing of innovation follows
a straightforward investment rule. As Rockett [30] observes, accordingly most [models] take the identity of the
innovator as given. Denicolò [9] is an exception, but his patent race model does not allow for attrition and second-
mover advantage.
28
6 Extensions
In this section, we discuss how some other aspects of innovative activity ﬁt into our model of
endogenous innovation and imitation. One of these is the ability of an innovating ﬁrm to raise the
imitator's entry barrier by making its product more costly to reverse engineer or by strengthening
its patentability, as described in the opening examples of the paper. Another is contracting between
the innovator and the imitator, which can consist in a takeover of the rival ﬁrm or a technology
transfer. From a formal standpoint these diﬀerent extensions add an intermediate decision to the
investment game between the innovative and imitative investment decisions. To the extent that
they raise the value of innovating, these extensions favor ﬁrst-mover advantage and the emergence
of preemption regimes, with contrasting implications for imitation timing and welfare.
6.1 Endogenous imitation cost
Suppose that the innovating ﬁrm may aﬀect the cost of imitation by varying the amount of either
technical or legal protection. In case of technical protection, the cost of reverse engineering can be
raised by increasing product complexity. For example an innovating ﬁrm can render its product
more diﬃcult to disassemble, or even add misleading complexity (Samuelson and Scotchmer [31]).
In the case of legal protection, wider patents imply higher costs for inventing around to develop a
non-infringing imitation, and ﬁrms may decide to pursue patent protection more or less aggressively
(Encaoua et al. [12]).
Such choices are incorporated into the model by supposing that when it invests at threshold
Yi, an innovating ﬁrm chooses how much additional cost, ρ, to incur in order to raise its rival's
imitation cost by an amount f (ρ).23 The imitation cost increase is instantaneous and the function
f is taken to be twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave with f(0) = 0 and limρ→0 f ′(ρ) =∞.
The ﬁxed costs of the innovator and imitator are accordingly increasing functions I (ρ) and K (ρ).
Proceeding by backward induction, through K(ρ) the cost-raising eﬀort determines the im-
itator payoﬀ F (Y ; ρ) := F (Y )|K=K(ρ) and standalone threshold Y F (ρ) := Y F
∣∣
K=K(ρ)
. At the
moment of innovation therefore, an innovator entering at the threshold Yi therefore faces the
decision problem
max
ρ∈R+
L (Yi; ρ) :=
(
piM
r − αYi − I (ρ)
)(
y
Yi
)β
− pi
M − piD
r − α
yβ
[max {Yi, Y F (ρ)}]β−1
.
23See Huisman and Kort [24] for a model of preemption with ﬁrms similarly competing on both the timing and
magnitude of investment.
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Let ρ∗ (Yi) denote the solution to this problem for a given innovation threshold Yi. At an interior
solution Y F (ρ∗) > Yi and ρ∗ satisﬁes
β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
f ′ (ρ∗) =
(
Y F (ρ∗)
Yi
)β
.
A straightforward comparative static argument establishes that the optimal cost-raising eﬀort is
increasing in the investment threshold and decreasing in the baseline imitation cost.24
To proceed further we focus on the situation where K ≥ K̂ so the dynamic competition is
naturally preemptive.25 Allowing the cost of imitation to be endogenous results in a higher leader
payoﬀ L (Y ; ρ∗ (Y )) and a lower follower payoﬀ F (Y ; ρ∗ (Y )) than when this cost is exogenous.
This makes the investment game even more preemptive. Since equilibrium payoﬀs are pegged to
the follower value under preemption, ﬁrms have a lower expected value in equilibrium. To avoid
this penalizing outcome ﬁrms would prefer to both commit ex-ante not to exert any cost-raising
eﬀort if they innovate. One way to achieve such a commitment is by agreeing to an open or
common technological standard, a measure frequently observed in early stages of a technology's
development and which is not desirable for ﬁrms if roles are predetermined (by Proposition 1).
Proposition 9 If the cost of imitation is endogenous and the investment game is naturally pre-
emptive ﬁrms beneﬁt from agreeing ex-ante to a common standard.
6.2 Takeover and licensing
Contracts ranging from acquisitions and pay-for-delay agreements to joint ventures and licensing
contracts typically play an important role in innovation decisions. These arrangements have
contrasting eﬀects on investment incentives that can be incorporated into our model. Assume
that ﬁrms can contract once to transfer either productive assets or technology in exchange for a
lump sum transfer, ϕ, from the innovator ﬁrm to the imitator, and that the contract is written by
the innovator who holds all the bargaining power.
Because imitation decreases industry proﬁt (2piD < piM ), it is eﬃcient for the industry if an
innovator pays its rival not to subsequently enter the market if it can, by taking over its assets or
24The latter property is in line with the situation of biopharmaceutical ﬁrms (see footnote 7 above) where greater
reliance is placed on patenting in the medications segment in which natural entry barriers are low than in the
vaccines segment.
25This restriction relates speciﬁcally to optimal stopping. For high values of the innovation threshold Yi, corner
solutions ρ∗ = 0 arise that result in a kink of L (Y ; ρ). In such cases the threshold strategies ﬁrms are assumed to
use needn't be optimal investment policies.
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engaging in some equivalent measures.26 Proceeding by backward induction, in the continuation
phase that begins when innovation occurs at a threshold Yi, expected payoﬀ of the potential
imitator is F (Yi). This continuation payoﬀ constitutes a participation constraint in any contract
that the innovator oﬀers. The innovating ﬁrm can therefore oﬀer a transfer whose value in time
t = 0 units satisﬁes ϕ∗ (Yi)∈ [F (Yi) , F (Yi) + L (Yi)|K=∞ − L (Yi)] at the moment when it invests.
If the innovator has all the bargaining power (ϕ∗ (Yi) =F (Yi)), its payoﬀ if it takes over the second
ﬁrm has a straightforward expression
LT (Y ) :=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − F (Y ) .
Then, if piM/piD ≥ β + 1 which occurs if either the eﬃciency eﬀect (piM − 2piD) is suﬃciently
strong or in industries with suﬃciently high demand growth or volatility, attrition does not occur
for any level of K. Otherwise, the follower payoﬀ is increasing in its bargaining power, which
raises industry proﬁt under preemption but renders preemption less likely.27
Whether the possibility of takeovers runs in the interest of the industry or not depends on
the cost of imitation. Under preemption expected proﬁts are pegged to the follower value and
therefore increase with takeovers if the follower has some bargaining power, whereas if K < K̂,
the industry functions naturally under attrition and ﬁrm values are pegged to the leader value.
Industry proﬁt then increases if takeovers are allowed, so one would expect an active market for
acquisitions to develop in such industries, and all the more so if demand growth and volatility are
high.
If a takeover is not possible an innovator must contend with follower entry but can recoup
revenue from the imitator's investment through a license fee. Suppose that K = K0 + K1 where
K0 is an incompressible level of imitation cost reﬂecting such items as distribution and marketing
expenses and K1 denotes the part of the product development cost that can be eliminated through
a technology transfer by ﬁrm 1. Licensing does not allow the innovator to push back the moment
of imitation, but creates an eﬃciency gain for the industry due to the elimination of a duplicative
expenditure. Supposing that the innovator holds all the bargaining power, it sets the maximum
26Pay-for-delay agreements (also called reverse payment settlements) can arise in the pharmaceutical industry,
generally in the context of a patent infringement suit brought by a brand-name company against a generic producer
that challenges the innovator's IPRs (see Hemphill [19] and Danzon [8]).
27As observed by one referee, an interesting case arises if bargaining power is evenly distributed. The innovator's
transfer is then ϕ∗(Yi) = F (Yi) + 0.5(L (Yi)K=∞ − L (Yi)), and the condition in K separating attrition from
preemption, which has the form L (Yi)K=∞−ϕ∗ (Yi) = ϕ∗ (Yi) with takeovers, reduces to L (Yi) = 2F (Yi). The
corresponding critical threshold K̂T with takeovers therefore satisﬁes K̂T > K̂ in this case.
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license fee consistent with the participation constraint at the moment of imitation, −K1. Pro-
ceeding by backward induction, the expected revenue from licensing then adds a positive term to
the leader payoﬀ which becomes
LL (Y ) :=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − (piM − piD
r − α max
{
Y, Y F
}−KI)( y
max {Y, Y F }
)β
.
As the leader payoﬀ shifts up to the left of Y F while leaving the follower payoﬀ function un-
changed, the investment game is more preemptive with licensing than with takeovers (as in the
case of takeovers however, follower bargaining power dampens this eﬀect and eventually reverses
this eﬀect). However, whereas the welfare consequences of takeovers are ambiguous (ﬁrms weakly
beneﬁt and the consumer surplus from innovation increases because product innovation occurs ear-
lier, but the consumer surplus from imitation is eliminated), the welfare consequences of licensing
are unambiguously positive. The visible eﬀect of licensing is the reduction in duplicative of R&D
eﬀorts as in Gallini [16], but an additional indirect beneﬁt stems from an increase of consumer
surplus that results from the acceleration of innovation.
Thus,
Proposition 10 With contracting between the innovator and the imitator (i) takeovers are the
preferred instrument of an innovator and raise industry proﬁt whereas (ii) licensing is Pareto-
improving.
7 Conclusion
We have sought to model the dynamic allocation of resources to innovation and imitation, explicitly
incorporating the interrelated investment decisions under uncertainty of imperfectly competitive
ﬁrms. As compared with the classic literature on innovation and patents, endogenizing the time at
which innovation and imitation occur in the presence of market uncertainty allows us to highlight
a novel policy channel, in which IPR levels act upon welfare through their eﬀect on dynamic
competition.
The main message that emerges from our analysis is a broadly familiar one, insofar as we
ﬁnd that IPRs must be important enough to provide a suﬃcient incentive for innovation. But by
integrating the theory of investment under uncertainty into the analysis of innovation incentives,
we are able to pinpoint the role of speciﬁc market characteristics which act as key determinants of
investment, and thus to provide a grounding for strong IPRs in circumstances that seem likely to
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be present in mature industries. In such industries we ﬁnd that the barriers to imitation should be
suﬃciently high so as to render dynamic competition between ﬁrms preemptive, and if discounting
is important enough competition should take the form of a winner-take-all contest. Moreover, a
regulator who would attempt to accelerate innovation by designating a market leader would lose
out on the social beneﬁts of dynamic competition, as the welfare achieved with optimal IPRs is
lower with predetermined roles than with endogenous innovation.
In those industries in which growth and volatility are relatively high on the other hand, which
are those most typically associated with vibrant innovation, attrition may be eﬀective in ensuring
that the additional beneﬁts of imitation resulting from greater product market competition do
not arrive excessively late. Even then some degree of IPR protection can be needed if the cost of
imitation is extremely low, in order to ensure that a ﬁrm that develops an imitative product as
the winner of the attrition game nevertheless pays a high enough entry cost so an industry does
not become mired in ineﬃcient dynamics.
In practice, antitrust and industrial policy decisions commonly focus on static product mar-
ket characteristics. The demand characteristics that we have highlighted, demand growth and
volatility, play at least as signiﬁcant a role in determining the investment incentives and prod-
uct development decisions, and as such should naturally underlie any determination of optimal
IPRs. As we have argued throughout in the footnotes, the policy measures taken in at least one
emblematic innovation-intensive industry seem to generally echo this analysis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Duopoly option value V D(Y )
Once the rival ﬁrm has invested at the market size threshold Y any remaining ﬁrm holds a standard
growth option (Dixit and Pindyck [10]) whose value is obtained by solving the optimal stopping
problem
V D (Y ) = sup
τ≥t
EY
 ∞∫
τ
piDY (s)e−rsds−Ke−rτ
 .
From the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, the value function V D(Y ) satisﬁes
rV D (Y ) dt = EY dV D (Y )
and expanding the right-hand side using Itô's lemma yields the ordinary diﬀerential equation that
V D(Y ) solves in the continuation region,
rV D(Y ) = αY
[
V D(Y )
]′
+
1
2
σ2Y 2
[
V D(Y )
]′′
,
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along with the boundary and smooth pasting conditions
V D (0) = 0
V D
(
Y F
)
=
piD
r − αY
F −K
V D
(
Y F
)
=
piD
r − α .
The function A1Y
β1 + A2Y
β2 is a candidate solution. The associated fundamental quadratic is
0.5σ2β (β − 1) + βα− r = 0 which has two roots of which only
β =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
is positive. Setting A2 = 0 to satisfy the ﬁrst boundary condition, it follows from the other
conditions that
Y F =
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
K
and that A1 is
(
piD/(β (r − α))) [Y F ]−(β−1) which yields the expression for A in the text.
A.2 Derivation of L(Y ) and M(Y )
Whereas the expression for the follower payoﬀ (3) is simply the discounted value of V D (Y ), several
steps are necessary to obtain (4) from the deﬁnition of L (Y ):
Ey
[∫ τ(max{Y,Y F})
τ(Y )
piMY (s)e−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I +
∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,Y F })
piDY (s)e−rsds
]
= Ey
[∫ ∞
τ(Y )
piMY (s)e−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I −
∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,Y F })
(
piM − piD)Y (s)e−rsds]
=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − piM − piD
r − α
yβ
[max {Y, Y F }]β−1
.
Finally the derivation of the simultaneous payoﬀ (5) is similar to (4), noting that the ﬂow proﬁt
upon investment is piD instead of piM and that there is no follow-on entry so the second integral
dropped altogether.
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A.3 Predetermined investment sequence
A.3.1 Critical imitation cost level K˜
As stated in the text, K˜ is deﬁned as the unique solution in K to L
(
Y L
)
= M
(
YM
)
. Since
K˜ ∈ ((piD/piM) I,∞) necessarily and using the deﬁnitions (4) and (5), the condition can be
expressed as(
piM
r − αY
L − I
)( y
Y L
)β − piM − piD
r − α Y
F
( y
Y F
)β
=
(
piD
r − αY
M − I
)( y
YM
)β
.
Substituting for Y L, Y F and YM and dividing both sides by (I/ (β − 1)) (y (β − 1) /β (r − α))β
yields (
piM
I
)β
− β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
K˜
I
)(
piD
K˜
)β
=
(
piD
I
)β
which after rearrangement gives the expression in the text.
A.3.2 Social welfare
Suppose that β > piD/
((
sM + piM
)− (sD + piD)) so W˜ (K) is decreasing over (0, K˜) and increas-
ing over
(
K˜,∞
)
. Then to determine the socially optimal imitation cost it is suﬃcient to compare
W˜ (0) and limK→∞ W˜ (K). Evaluating, the condition W˜ (0) < limK→∞ W˜ (K) is(
β
sD
piD
+ β + 1
)
I
β − 1
( y
YM
)β
<
(
β
sM
piM
+ 1
)
I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
.
Substituting for Y L and YM , and dividing both sides by (I/ (β − 1)) (y (β − 1)piD/β (r − α))β
yields an equivalent condition after rearrangement,
fA.3 (β) :=
(
piM
piD
)β (
β
sM
piM
+ 1
)
−
(
β
sD
piD
+ β + 1
)
> 0.
The function on the left-hand side satisﬁes fA.3 (1) =
((
sM + piM
)− (sD + 2piD)) /piD < 0 and
limβ→∞ fA.3 (β) =∞. Moreover it is strictly convex since
f ′′A.3 (β) =
(
piM
piD
)β (
2
sM
piM
ln
piM
piD
+
(
β
sM
piM
+ 1
)(
ln
piM
piD
)2)
> 0.
Therefore there exists a unique βA.3 > 1 such that fA.3 (β) > 0 if and only if β > βA.3. Letting
β˜ := max
{
βA.3, pi
D/
((
sM + piM
)− (sD + piD))}, K˜W = 0 (if β ≤ β˜) or ∞ (if β ≥ β˜).
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A.4 Proposition 2 (endogenous investment symmetric equilibrium)
A.4.1 Critical imitation cost level K̂
As stated in the text, K̂ is deﬁned as the unique solution in K to L
(
Y L
)
= F
(
Y F
)
. It is straight-
forward to check that K̂ > K˜, since if K ≤ K˜, L (Y L) < L (YM) = M (YM) < F (YM) <
F
(
Y F
)
, where the last two inequalities respectively hold because K˜ < I and because Y F maxi-
mizes Y F . Using the deﬁnitions (3) and (4), the condition can be expressed as
(
piM
r − αY
L − I
)( y
Y L
)β − piM − piD
r − α Y
F
( y
Y F
)β
=
(
piD
r − αY
F − K̂
)( y
Y F
)β
.
Substituting for Y L and Y F , and dividing both sides by (1/ (β − 1)) (y (β − 1) /β (r − α))β yields
I
(
piM
I
)β
− β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
K̂
(
piD
K̂
)β
= K̂
(
piD
K̂
)β
which after rearrangement gives the expression in the text.
A.4.2 Part (i)
There are two subcases for this part, K ≤ K˜ and K˜ < K < K̂ (see Figures 1 and 2).
K ≤ K˜ subcase This is a standard war of attrition (in thresholds) over (YM ,∞). Therefore
provided that ﬁrms do not move with positive probability in
[
y, YM
]
the equilibrium distribution
follows from the argument in Hendricks et al. [20]. In a nondegenerate (and symmetric) mixed
strategy equilibrium, ﬁrms randomize investment triggers continuously over
[
YM ,∞). To derive
the equilibrium distribution assume that ﬁrm j 6= i randomizes her investment trigger at t = 0
according to a cumulative distribution function G. Firm i's expected payoﬀ from investing at a
threshold Yi ≥ YM is∫ ∞
YM
V (Yi, s)g(s)ds =
∫ Yi
YM
F (s)g(s)ds+ (1−G(Yi))M(Yi).
Firm i will randomize if ∂
(∫∞
YM V (Yi, s)g(s)ds
)
/∂Yi = 0 over the support, that is if G satisﬁes
[F (Y )−M(Y )] g (Y ) = −M ′(Y ) [1−G (Y )] for all Y ∈ (YM ,∞). As the same condition holds
for ﬁrm −i, the equilibrium distribution for each ﬁrm is
Ga (Y ) = 1− exp
∫ Y
YM
M ′(s)
F (s)−M(s)ds
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and substituting for F and M gives
Ga (Y ) =
 0, Y < Y
M
1− ( Y
YM
)β I
I−K e
−β I
I−K
(
Y
YM
−1
)
, Y ≥ YM .
Then, the distribution of the equilibrium innovation threshold for the industry Y is just that of
the minimum of the ﬁrm thresholds, 1− (1−Ga (y))2.
It is claimed in the text (Section 4.3.1) that an increase in imitation cost accelerates innovation.
As for Y > YM ,
∂Ga
∂K
=
(
Y
YM
)β I
I−K
e
−β I
I−K
(
Y
YM
−1
)
β
I
(I −K)2
(
Y
YM
− 1− ln Y
YM
)
> 0
(the last bracketed term is positive by the logarithm inequality), the distribution of each ﬁrm's
innovation threshold (and therefore of Y ) is shifted leftward by an increase in imitation cost.
K˜ < K < K̂ subcase This is also a war of attrition but since L (Y ) is decreasing over
(
Y L, Y F
)
,
increasing over
(
Y F , YM
)
and decreasing over
(
YM ,∞) its form is nonstandard. To identify the
support of the mixed strategies, observe that any Yi ∈
(
y, Y L
)
is a strictly dominated strategy
and no player puts positive probability on Y L in a symmetric equilibrium. Similarly any Yi ∈(
sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )} , YM) is strictly dominated by YM , and no player puts positive
probability on YM in a symmetric equilibrium. Investment thresholds are therefore continuously
distributed over
[
Y L, sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )}] ∪ [YM ,∞).
Letting Gb denote the equilibrium distribution, assume that ﬁrm j 6= i randomizes her invest-
ment trigger. Firm i randomizes if ∂
(∫∞
YM V (Yi, s)gb(s)ds
)
/∂Yi = 0 over the support, that is if Gb
satisﬁes [F (Y )− L(Y )] gb (Yi) = −L′(Y ) [1−Gb (Y )] for all Y ∈
(
Y L, sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )})
and [F (Y )−M(Y )] gb (Y ) = −M ′(Y ) [1−Gb (Y )] for all Y ∈
(
YM ,∞). The former condition
holds for
Ga′ (Y ) = 1− exp
∫ Y
Y L
L′(s)
F (Y F )− L(s)ds
=
L
(
Y L
)− L (Y )
F (Y F )− L (Y )
while the latter condition is satisﬁed by Gα so that the equilibrium distribution is
Gb (Y ) =

0, Y < Y L
Ga′ (Y ) , Y
L ≤ Y ≤ Y
Ga′
(
Y
)
, Y < Y < YM
Ga′
(
Y
)
+
(
1−Ga′
(
Y
))
Ga (Y ) , Y ≥ YM
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where Y := sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )} for compactness. To establish that an increase in
imitation cost accelerates innovation as claimed in the text, observe that L
(
Y L
)− L (Y ) is inde-
pendent of K while F
(
Y F
) − L (Y ) is decreasing in K so ∂Ga′/∂K > 0 and it also holds that
∂
(
sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )}) /∂K > 0 so that, given that ∂Ga/∂K > 0 as seen above,
∂Gb/∂K > 0 over the relevant range.
A.4.3 Part (ii)
There are two subcases for this part, K̂ < K < I and K ≥ I (see Figures 3 and 4). It is simpler
to begin with the subcase K ≥ I which is standard.
K ≥ I subcase For K ≥ I, L (Y F ) ≥ F (Y F ) so there exists a unique Y P < Y F such that
L
(
Y P
)
= F
(
Y F
)
. The preemption range is P = (Y P , Y F ), and ﬁrms seek to innovate just before
their rival for any Y−i ∈ P. In equilibrium both ﬁrms set Yi = Y P which by the tie-breaking rule
results in either ﬁrm innovating at Y P with equal probability.
As joint investment equilibria also arise in preemption models, it must be veriﬁed that this
is not the case here. Investment at the optimal simultaneous investment threshold YM by both
ﬁrms results in a payoﬀ M
(
YM
)
whereas for K ≥ I (for K > K˜ in fact), L (Y L) > M (YM), so
joint investment cannot be an equilibrium.
K̂ < K < I subcase For K̂ < K < I, the condition L (Y ) = F (Y ) has two roots Y P and
supP with Y P < Y L and supP ∈ (Y L, Y F ). For a given Y > supP, L (Y ) ≤ F (Y F ) so playing
beyond the preemption range P is a dominated strategy. Over P the ﬁrms preempt one another
as in the previous subcase and in equilibrium both ﬁrms invest at Y P , which by the tie-breaking
rule (7) results in either ﬁrm investing at Y P with equal probability.
A.4.4 Part (iii)
If K = K̂, then L
(
Y L
)
= F
(
Y F
)
and
(
Y L, Y L
)
is the only symmetric equilibrium.
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A.5 Proposition 3 (comparative statics of K̂)
For the comparative static in
(
piM/piD
)
evaluating the relevant partial derivatives and rearranging
yields
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
= −β
piM
piD
− 1
piM
piD
(
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
))K̂
so ∂K̂/∂
(
piM/piD
)
< 0 directly, whereas for the comparative statics in β
∂K̂
∂β
=
− ln K̂ +
((
piM
piD
− 1
)(
piM
piD
)β − (1 + β (piM
piD
− 1
))(
piM
piD
)β
ln pi
M
piD
)(
piM
piD
)β
(
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
))(
piM
piD
)2β
 K̂β − 1
= − 1
β − 1
ln K̂ − piMpiD − 1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
 K̂.
The sign of ∂K̂/∂β is the opposite of that of the (bracketed) middle term. Applying the logarithm
inequality lnx > (x− 1) /x for x > 0, x 6= 1 with x = (1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD) yields
ln
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
piM
piD
 > (β − 1)
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
so ∂K̂/∂β < 0 and hence ∂K̂/∂α, ∂K̂/∂σ > 0.
A.6 Proposition 5 (KW ≥ K˜)
If K < K˜, ﬁrms randomize investment triggers over
[
YM ,∞) according to the distribution Ga (Y )
and imitator entry is immediate. As discussed in the text, producer surplus is constant over
[
0, K˜
]
,
whereas since Y is stochastically decreasing in K (see Section A.4) consumer surplus from both
innovation and imitation is increasing in K over this range.
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A.7 Lemma 1 (characterization of Ŷ WP )
Suppose K > K̂ so in equilibrium the innovation threshold is Y = Y P ∈ [(r − α) I/piM , Y L) and
imitation occurs at Y F . The social welfare function (9) is
W (K) =
(
piM + sM
r − α Y
P − I
)( y
Y P
)β
+
((
2piD + sD
)− (piM + sM)
r − α Y
F −K
)( y
Y F
)β
=
(
piM + sM
r − α Y
P − I
)( y
Y P
)β
+
(
β
(
sD − (piM + sM)
piD
)
+ β + 1
)
piDy
β (r − α)
( y
Y F
)β−1
and the value W (K̂) results by continuity since lim
K→K̂ Y
P = Y L.
A preliminary step is to obtain an expression for dY P /dK which is used subsequently in the
computation of W ′(K). Recall that Y P is deﬁned implicitly by the condition L
(
Y P
)
= F
(
Y F
)
.
Dividing this identity by yβ and grouping the Y P and Y F terms yields a more compact form,
piM
r − α
1
[Y P ]β−1
− I
[Y P ]β
=
piM
r − α
1
[Y F ]β−1
− K
[Y F ]β
=
(
piM
r − α −
β − 1
β
piD
r − α
)
1
[Y F ]β−1
.
Observe that
[
Y P
]−β
=
[(
piM
r−αY
F −K
)
/
(
piM
r−αY
P − I
)] [
Y F
]−β
. The above condition has the
form fA.6
(
Y P
)
= gA.6 (K), so dY
P /dK = g′
A.6
(K)/f ′
A.6
(Y P ) with
f ′A.6
(
Y P
)
= − (β − 1) pi
M
r − α
1
[Y P ]β
+ β
I
[Y P ]β+1
= (β − 1) pi
M
r − α
Y L − Y P
[Y P ]β+1
> 0
and
g′A.6 (K) = −
β − 1
Y F
dY F
dK
gA.6 (K) < 0.
Substituting g(K) = f
(
Y P
)
into g′(K) and then developing yields
dY P
dK
= −β − 1
K
fA.6
(
Y P
)
f ′
A.6
(Y P )
= −r − α
piM
piM
r−αY
P − I
Y L − Y P
Y P
K
.
Evaluating W ′(K) gives
W ′ (K) =
(
− (β − 1) s
M + piM
r − α Y
P + βI
)
yβ
[Y P ]β+1
dY P
dK
−
(
β
(
sD − (piM + sM)
piD
)
+ β + 1
)( y
Y F
)β
.
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Substitute the expression for dY P /dK above to get
W ′ (K) =
(
− (β − 1) s
M + piM
r − α Y
P + βI
)(
−r − α
piM
piM
r−αY
P − I
Y L − Y P
1
K
)( y
Y P
)β
−
(
β
(
sD − (piM + sM)
piD
)
+ β + 1
)( y
Y F
)β
.
Substituting for
[
Y P
]−β
in the ﬁrst term, rearranging, and factoring
(
y/Y F
)β
yields
W ′ (K) =
(
(β − 1)
((
sM
piM
+ 1
)
Y P − Y L
) piM
r−αY
F −K
Y L − Y P
1
K
−
(
β
(
sD − (piM + sM)
piD
)
+ β + 1
))( y
Y F
)β
=
((
(β − 1)
((
sM
piM
+ 1
)(
Y P − Y L)+ sM
piM
Y L
)) β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
Y L − Y P
−
(
β
(
sD − (piM + sM)
piD
)
+ β + 1
))( y
Y F
)β
=
(
−
(
sM
piM
+ 1
)(
β
piM
piD
− (β − 1)
)
+
sM
piM
(
β
piM
piD
− (β − 1)
)
Y L
Y L − Y P
−
(
β
(
sD − (piM + sM)
piD
)
+ β + 1
))( y
Y F
)β
.
Regrouping the constant (non-Y ) terms gives
−
(
sM
piM
+ 1
)(
β
piM
piD
− (β − 1)
)
−
(
β
(
sD − (piM + sM)
piD
)
+ β + 1
)
= (β − 1) s
M
piM
− β s
D
piD
− 2.
Therefore
W ′ (K) =
((
β
sM
piD
− (β − 1) s
M
piM
)
Y L
Y L − Y P + (β − 1)
sM
piM
− β s
D
piD
− 2
)( y
Y F
)β
.
Since β
(
sM/piD
)
> (β − 1) (sM/piM) and lim
K→K̂ Y
P = Y L, lim
K→K̂W
′(K) = +∞. More-
over Y L/
(
Y L − Y P ) and y/Y F are both decreasing functions of K, so W ′ is decreasing over(
K̂,∞
)
. Provided that limK→∞W ′(K) < 0 therefore, the ﬁrst-order condition has a unique root
in
(
K̂,∞
)
.
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Since limK→∞ Y P = (r − α) I/piM = ((β − 1) /β)Y L, the sign of limK→∞W ′(K) is the same
as that of
β
(
β
sM
piD
− (β − 1) s
M
piM
)
+ (β − 1) s
M
piM
− β s
D
piD
− 2
= β2
sM
piD
− (β − 1)2 s
M
piM
− β s
D
piD
− 2.
Taken as a function of β, this is a quadratic ∆ (β), with ∆ (1) =
(
sM − sD − 2piD) /piD < 0 and
limβ→∞∆ (β) = ∞. Therefore there exists a unique β̂ > 1 such that ∆
(
β̂
)
= 0. It follows
that the constrained optimization problem max
K≥K̂W (K) has a unique optimum, which is ﬁnite
(interior) if β < β̂ and inﬁnite otherwise. Provided that β < β̂, the ﬁrst-order condition then
yields the expression for Ŷ WP given in the proposition.
A.8 Lemma 2 (condition for K̂W ≥ K̂)
The lemma is established by ﬁrst deriving an upper bound of W over
[
0, K̂
)
(attrition) and then
comparing this bound with the maximum value over
[
K̂,∞
]
.
Under attrition, expected social welfare (9) can be expressed
W (K) = Ey
[(
sM + piM
r − α Y − I
)( y
Y
)β]
+ Ey
[((
sD + 2piD
)− (sM + piM)
r − α max
{
Y , Y F
}−K)( y
max {Y , Y F }
)β]
.
The ﬁrst integrand is a quasiconcave function of investment threshold with a maximum at (β (r − α) I) /((β−
1)(sM + piM )) ≤ Y L ≤ Y , which therefore is decreasing over (Y L,∞). Therefore
Ey
[(
sM + piM
r − α Y − I
)( y
Y
)β] ≤ (sM + piM
r − α Y
L − I
)( y
Y L
)β
≤
(
β
sM
piM
+ 1
)
I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
. (13)
The bound on the second summand uses the assumption that the static entry incentive is excessive,
Ey
[((
sD + 2piD
)− (sM + piM)
r − α max
{
Y , Y F
}−K)( y
max {Y , Y F }
)β]
≤ Ey
[(
piD
r − α max
{
Y , Y F
}−K)( y
max {Y , Y F }
)β]
.
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The term on the right-hand side is the equilibrium expected payoﬀ of a follower, Ey
[
F
(
max
{
Y , Y F
})]
,
that ﬁrm i obtains by setting Yi =∞. Equilibrium payoﬀs are constant over the support of mixed
strategies, so Ey
[
F
(
max
{
Y , Y F
})]
= max
{
L
(
Y L
)
, L
(
YM
)}
. This last term is maximized for
K = K̂, by Proposition 4. Therefore
Ey
[((
sD + 2piD
)− (sM + piM)
r − α max
{
Y , Y F
}−K)( y
max {Y , Y F }
)β]
≤ K̂
β − 1
(
y
Ŷ F
)β
where Ŷ F :=
(
β (r − α) K̂
)
/((β−1)piD)) =
(
K̂/I
) (
piM/piD
)
Y L. Substituting for
(
K̂/I
)−(β−1)
gives
Ey
[((
sD + 2piD
)− (sM + piM)
r − α max
{
Y , Y F
}−K)( y
max {Y , Y F }
)β]
≤ 1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
) I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
(14)
<
0.5I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
.
Combining (13) and (14) yields
max
K∈[0,K̂)
W (K) <
(
β
sM
piM
+ 1.5
)
I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
.
Over
[
K̂,∞
]
, social welfare can be evaluated exactly, yielding28
max
K∈[K̂,∞]
W (K) =

sM
piM
(1+ψ)β
ψ
I
β−1
( y
Y L
)β
, β < β̂(
β
β−1
)β
sM
piM
I
( y
Y L
)β
, β ≥ β̂
(15)
where ψ is given in Lemma 1. By revealed preference, the optimal welfare level is at least as large
as if the regulator sets an inﬁnite cost of imitation, so
max
K∈[K̂,∞]
W (K) ≥
(
β
β − 1
)β sM
piM
I
( y
Y L
)β
.
A suﬃcient condition for max
K∈[0,K̂)W (K) < maxK∈[K̂,∞]W (K) is therefore(
β
β − 1
)β sM
piM
I
( y
Y L
)β
>
(
β
sM
piM
+ 1.5
)
I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
.
Cancelling common terms and rearranging yields((
β
β − 1
)β−1
− 1
)
sM
piM
>
3
2β
which establishes the condition in the text.
28The derivation is available from the authors.
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A.9 Proposition 7 (speciﬁc welfare cases)
For part (i), we consider the limiting case sM = 0 (assuming that sD > 0) and then use the
continuity of W (K). From the expression of W (K) (9), only producer surplus and the consumer
surplus from imitation matter in this case. Both of these are decreasing in K over
(
K̂,∞
]
so
any maximum of K must lie in
(
K˜, K̂
]
(the lower bound is the one given by Proposition 5).
Moreover, since producer surplus is maximized at K̂ (Proposition 4), the sign of the left derivative
of welfare at K̂, lim
K→K̂−W
′(K), depends only on the consumer surplus from imitation. Given
the innovation threshold under attrition Y , this term is
(
sD − sM) yβ
r − α Ey
1
[max {Y , Y F }](β−1)
=
(
sD − sM) yβ
r − α
(
1
[Y F ](β−1)
Pr
{
Y ≤ Y F}+ EY >Y F 1
Y (β−1)
)
=
(
sD − sM) yβ
(r − α) [Y F ](β−1)
(
Gc
(
Y L
)
+
∫ ∞
YM
(
Y F
s
)β−1
dGc(s)
)
where Gc = 1− (1−Gb (Y ))2 denotes the equilibrium distribution of Y . Since Gb
(
Y
)∣∣
K=K̂
= 1
(recall that Y := sup
{
Z < YM
∣∣L(Z) > L(YM )}) Gc (Y )∣∣K=K̂ = 1 and the right hand term
vanishes at K̂ (note that dGc/dY = 2 (1−Gb) (dGb/dY )). Therefore at K̂ only the direct eﬀect
∂Y F /∂K remains, hence
lim
K→K̂−
W ′(K) = −(β − 1)s
D − sM
r − α
( y
Y F
)β ∂Y F
∂K
≤ 0
with strict inequality if sD > sM . For sM = 0 therefore, lim
K→K̂−W
′(K) < 0 so the maximum
of W lies in
(
K˜, K̂
)
.
The argument for part (ii) is straightforward. From the expression ofW (K) (9), only producer
surplus and the consumer surplus from innovation matter in this case. The ﬁrst of these is weakly
increasing in K over
[
0, K̂
]
and the second is increasing over R+, so the maximum of W (K) lies
in
(
K̂,∞
]
.
A.10 Proposition 8 (predetermined sequence vs. endogenous innovation wel-
fare)
For suﬃciently large β (β ≥ β̂ and sM/piM ≥ Ω (β)), with endogenous ﬁrm roles the socially
optimal imitation cost K̂W =∞ results in a level of welfare
Ŵ
(
K̂W
)
=
(
β
β − 1
)β sM
piM
I
( y
Y L
)β
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whereas with predetermined roles, for β ≥ β˜, K˜W =∞ results in a level of welfare
W˜W
(
K˜W
)
=
(
β
sM
piM
+ 1
)
I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
.
Then
Ŵ
(
K̂W
)
− W˜W
(
K˜W
)
=
(
β
((
β
β − 1
)β−1
− 1
)
sM
piM
− 1
)
I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
≥ 0.5I
β − 1
( y
Y L
)β
where the second line uses sM/piM ≥ Ω (β).
A.11 Proposition 10 (takeovers and licensing)
Before establishing the proposition we verify the claim made in the text, i.e. that attrition does
not occur if piM/piD ≥ β + 1. Consider the limiting case K = 0. The leader payoﬀ LT (Y ) is
maximized at the threshold Y T = (β (r − α) I) /((β − 1)(piM − piD)). The investment game is
(weakly) preemptive if LT
(
Y T
) ≥ F (Y T ), that is if(
piM − piD
r − α Y
T − I
)( y
Y T
)β ≥ piD
r − αY
T
( y
Y T
)β
which yields the desired condition on piM/piD.
To establish the proposition we ﬁrst verify that a takeover is the preferred instrument. The
condition LT (Y ) ≥ LL (Y ) (with K = K0) works out to(
piM − piD
r − α max
{
Y, Y F
}−K0)( y
max {Y, Y F }
)β
≥
(
piD
r − α max
{
Y, Y F
}−K0 −K1)( y
max {Y, Y F }
)β
which holds because of the eﬃciency eﬀect piM > 2piD.
That takeovers increase ﬁrm proﬁt for K < K̂ follows from LT (Y ) > L(Y ) and the rent
dissipation property of attrition and preemption.
Similarly, licensing (providedK1 > 0) increases ﬁrm proﬁt while leaving the timing of imitation
unchanged. It therefore remains to verify that licensing results in earlier innovation. Let K̂L < K̂
denote the critical threshold that separates attrition and preemption in the presence of licensing,
which solves LL
(
Y L
)
= F (Y F ) (as licensing only has a level eﬀect on the leader payoﬀ for Y < Y F
the payoﬀ LL(Y ) is maximized at Y L). For K ≥ K̂L, as LL (Y ) > L(Y ) allowing licensing
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results in innovation at a threshold that is either lower than the preemption threshold without
licensing or weakly lower than the previous possible innovation thresholds. Otherwise if K < K̂L,
the industry is in an attrition regime both with and without licensing and the distribution of
innovation thresholds shifts left with licensing.
B Dynamic representation of the investment game
To represent the investment game whose normal form is studied in Section 4 in continuous
time, assume that the feasible investment strategies of ﬁrms are ﬁrst-hitting times τ (Yi) :=
inf {t ≥ 0 |Y (t) ≥ Yi }. This applies for instance if managerial decisions consist of hurdle rates((
Yipi
M/ (r − α)) /I) − 1 for innovative investment. Then the distributions of investment times
are ordered by the investment thresholds Yi and the investment game is isomorphic that in Fuden-
berg and Tirole [14]. Their analysis applies verbatim, by deﬁning simple strategies over investment
thresholds rather than time.29
B.1 Strategies and payoﬀs
In the dynamic representation of the investment game the continuation payoﬀs depend on the
current state of the stochastic process y ∈ R+ and are accordingly denoted Ly (Y ), F y (Y ) and
My(Y ).
An extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} in state y is a pair of real-valued functions
(Gyi , α
y
i ) : [y,∞)× [y,∞)→ [0, 1]× [0, 1] such that (a) Gyi is non-decreasing and right-continuous,
(b) αyi (Y ) > 0 ⇒ Gyi (Y ) = 1, (c) αyi is right-diﬀerentiable and (d) if αyi (Y ) = 0 and Y =
inf {Z ≥ Y, αyi (Z) > 0} then αyi has positive right-derivative at Y .
Let Gy−i (Y ) := limZ→Y − G
y
i (Z) denote the left-hand limit of G
y
i (Y ), a
y
i (Y ) = G
y
i (Y ) −
Gy−i (Y ) the magnitude of any jump at Y and set G
y−
i (y) = 0, i = 1, 2. Let Yi (y) =∞ if αyi (Y ) =
0 for all Y ≥ y and Yi (y) = inf {Z ≥ y, αyi (Z) > 0} otherwise, so Y (y) = min {Y1 (y) ,Y2 (y)}
denotes the ﬁrst threshold at which an investment is certain to occur. Finally let
µL(u, v) :=
u(1− v)
u+ v − uv and µM (u, v) :=
uv
u+ v − uv .
29Steg and Thijssen [32] study an investment game with closed-loop stopping times strategies and obtain similar
equilibrium outcomes. Their framework accounts for the process exiting the attrition region, whereas with ﬁrst-
hitting time strategies ﬁrms remain within the attrition region once it has been attained even if the value of the
process subsequently exits.
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Firm payoﬀs are
V y
(
(Gyi , α
y
i ) ,
(
Gyj , α
y
j
))
=∫ max{Y(y)−,y}
y
(
Ly (s)
(
1−Gyj (s)
)
dGyi (s) + F
y (s) (1−Gyi (s)) dGyj (s)
)
+
∑
Z<Y(y)
ayi (Z) a
y
j (Z)M
y(Z)

+
(
1−Gy−i (Y (y))
)(
1−Gy−j (Y (y))
)
WY(y)
(
(Gyi , α
y
i ) ,
(
Gyj , α
y
j
))
,
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j where
W Y
(
(Gyi , α
y
i ) ,
(
Gyj , α
y
j
))
=
ay−j (Y )
1−Gy−j (Y )
((1− αyi (Y ))F y (Y ) + αyi (Y )My(Y ))+
1−Gyj (Y )
1−Gy−j (Y )
Ly (Y )
if Yi (y) < Yj (y),
=
ay−i (Y )
1−Gy−i (Y )
((
1− αyj (Y )
)
Ly (Y ) + αyj (Y )M
y(Y )
)
+
1−Gyi (Y )
1−Gy−i (Y )
F y (Y )
if Yi (y) > Yj (y) and
=

My(Y ), ayi (Y ) = a
y
j (Y ) = 1
µL(a
y
i (Y ), a
y
j (Y ))L
y (Y ) + µyL(a
y
j (Y ), a
y
i (Y ))F
y (Y )
+µyM (a
y
i (Y ), a
y
j (Y ))M
y (Y ) ,
0 < ayi (Y ) + a
y
j (Y ) < 2
(ayi (Y ))
′
Ly(Y )+(ayj (Y ))
′
F y(Y )
(ayi (Y ))
′
+(ayj (Y ))
′ , a
y
i (Y ) + a
y
j (Y ) = 0
if Yi (y) = Yj (y).
For given y, a pair of simple strategies ((Gy1, α
y
1) , (G
y
2, α
y
2)) is a Nash equilibrium if (G
y
i , α
y
i )
maximizes V y
(
(Gyi , α
y
i ) ,
(
Gyj , α
y
j
))
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. A collection of simple strategies ((Gyi (Y ) , αyi (Y )))y>0
is consistent if for y ≤ Y ≤ Z, Gyi (Z) = Gyi (Y ) + (1−Gyi (Y ))GYi (Z) and αyi (Z) = αYi (Z). The
consistent strategies ((Gy1 (Y ) , α
y
1 (Y )))y>0 and ((G
y
2 (Y ) , α
y
2 (Y )))y>0 are a perfect equilibrium if
the simple strategies (Gy1 (Y ) , α
y
1 (Y )) and (G
y
2 (Y ) , α
y
2 (Y )) are a Nash equilibrium for every y.
B.2 Equilibrium
In the closure of the attrition range (K ≤ K̂) ﬁrms do not resort to extended mixed strategies.
Equilibrium strategies are therefore obtained from the unconditional strategies Ga(Y ) or Gb(Y )
(see Section A.4) according to whether K ≤ K̂ or K˜ < K < K̂. Therefore, letting Gya(Y ) :=
Ga(Y )−Ga(y)
1−Ga(y) and G
y
b (Y ) :=
Gb(Y )−Gb(y)
1−Gb(y) , (G
y
i (Y ) , α
y
i (Y )) = (G
y
a(Y ), 0) and (G
y
i (Y ) , α
y
i (Y )) =(
Gyb (Y ), 0
)
are symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in these two subcases.
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In the preemption range (K > K̂) the ﬁrms do resort to extended mixed strategies and there
are two subcases that we consider successively.
B.2.1 K̂ < K < I subcase
This is the case represented in Figure 3 whose key features are that the preemption range (over
which Ly(Y ) > F y(Y )) is the bounded interval
(
Y P , supP) ⊂ (Y P , Y F ), and that if a threshold
beyond this range is reached, ﬁrms play a waiting game as F y(Y ) > Ly(Y ) for Y > supP. In a
dynamic representation of the game, subgame perfect equilibrium strategies must account for this
possibility.
At any y > supP the payoﬀ to leading lies below the follower payoﬀ. It is not monotonic
however, and there exists a unique threshold Y ∈ (supP, Y F ) such that Ly (Y ) = Ly (YM). The
leader payoﬀ is decreasing only over (supP, Y )∪(YM ,∞), and it is this range that constitutes the
support of mixed strategies. The attrition subgame is then solved similarly to the K˜ < K < K̂
case in Section A.4 yielding unconditional distributions
Gd (Y ) = 1− exp
∫ Y
supP
[Ly(s)]′
F (max {Y, Y F })− Ly(s)ds
and
Ge (Y ) =

0, Y < supP
Gd (Y ) , supP ≤ Y ≤ Y
Gd (Y ) , Y < Y < Y
M
Gd (Y ) + (1−Gd (Y ))Ga (Y ) , Y ≥ YM
so that the conditional distribution is Gye(Y ) :=
Ge(Y )−Ge(y)
1−Ge(y) .
If y lies in the preemption range, the reasoning is standard and results in ﬁrms investing
immediately and using the strategy extensions to coordinate simultaneous investment.
Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium strategies are (Gyi (Y ), α
y
i (Y )) with
Gyi (Y ) =

0, Y < Y P
1, Y P ≤ Y < supP
Gye(Y ), Y ≥ supP
,
αyi (Y ) =

0, Y < Y P
Ly(Y )−F y(Y )
Ly(Y )−My(Y ) , Y
P ≤ Y < supP
0, Y ≥ supP
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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B.2.2 K̂ ≥ I subcase
Here Ly(Y ) > F y(Y ) over
(
Y P , Y F
)
so the investment game is a standard preemption game. A
speciﬁcity of the investment game studied here is that for K > I, My lies strictly above F y over[
Y F ,∞). Symmetric equilibrium strategies are nevertheless those of a standard real option game,
yielding (Gyi (Y ), α
y
i (Y )) with
Gyi (Y ) =
{
0, Y < Y P
1, Y ≥ Y P ,
αyi (Y ) =

0, Y < Y P
Ly(Y )−F y(Y )
Ly(Y )−My(Y ) , Y
P ≤ Y < Y F
1, Y ≥ Y F
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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